Challenges for a Peace regime on
the Korean Peninsula and an East Asia Community:
Sino-American rivalry as one, among
many, stumbling blocks?
In 2021 there
have been signs of improved relations between South and North Korea, with an
exchange of letters between the leaders and restoration of the hotlines as the
main points. This is a fragile but positive development that could be
challenged by the ongoing military exercises (written in August 2021). and the
South Korean political calendar with a presidential election in March 2022, as
well as a multitude of minor and major events over the coming months. Especially
in the backwater of the military exercises, we can expect to see more
aggressive behavior from Pyongyang, with arms testing and potentially testing
of nuclear components or even a full test.
Divergent
trends have characterized northeast Asia: we have a relatively positive
economic cooperation and interdependence and increased militarization and
geopolitical competition, not least the Great Power competition between China
and the U.S. The relations with North Korea are not only in the hands of the
two Korean capitals; arguably, the bilateral ties between Pyongyang and Seoul
are even more dependent on external factors than the bilateral ones. This is
true, not least, as North Korea has consistently seen the relations with Seoul
as secondary to the one with Washington and Bejing. Even if there is some
potential to improve relations between Pyongyang and other states, be that
China, South Korea, the USA, or even Japan, it I difficult to be overly positive
about the future. The prospects for a peace regime or a community-building
process depend on a regional mechanism to ensure that a long-term, stable relationship
is built with Pyongyang, which will focus on this paper.
Security and
Community building today
Northeast
Asia remains the only region that has no security organization that includes
all conflicting parties. Something problematic considering the conventional
arms race and historical enmities, the de
facto nuclear weapons status of North
Korea, and the long-term implications for the region. So far, growing economic
cooperation among most of the region's states has not translated into
cooperative behavior in the security field. Consequently, there is a growing
need for multilateral and inclusive structures to create a platform for peace,
security, and integration at the regional level. At the very least, this could
help secure and "lock-in" progress on the Korean Peninsula and bridge
challenges in bilateral relations. It could also simultaneously provide
security guarantees for North Korea that feels a genuine threat to its security
and regional states, which feel threatened by North Korea's nuclear program.
There is an
argument to be made that improvements in bilateral relations could result in
regional security. Still, the situation on Korean Peninsula demonstrates that
while advances in bilateral, or even personal, ties provide a departure point,
such arrangements are hard-pressed to sustain and diversify the security dividend.
Divergent interests, changes in political goals and administrations, and rising
tensions between China and the U.S. will destabilize bilateral exchanges,
making regional structures more necessary for maintaining long-term stability.
The Second Summit in Hanoi is an excellent example of this where intentions were
good but where parties' positions are too far away from each other, and the
person-to-person contacts could only reach so far.
This is not
to say that there are no regional structures in Northeast Asia or regional
dialogue in the security domain. However, much of the discussion focuses on
economic issues, involves trans-regional organizations, and has proven largely
ineffective in addressing the pressing challenge of security-building in the
Northeast Asian context outside of bilateral talks. It also often excludes the
two most pressing challenges in the region – North Korea and Taiwan. At the
same time, regional tensions have increased: a de
facto nuclear-armed North Korea that is
unlikely to denuclearize, thus raising the likelihood of a nuclear arms race. Additionally,
the rocky period of President Trump and the rapid departure of U.S. troops from
Afghanistan has diminished the credibility of the U.S. as a security guarantor.
This has coincided with strained relations between Japan and South Korea, as
well as between China and most of the region, and perhaps most prominently
between China and the U.S. Neither development speaks for a more multilateral engagement,
unless directed towards a specific actor or as a result of a significant
incident that raises the awareness of the need.
As noted
above, the need for regional structures is not just limited to the Korean
Peninsula; various issues in the region require management, including Sino-U.S.
tensions, the Cross-Straits dilemma, and ongoing hostility between the ROK and
Japan, to mention a few. Although several bilateral meetings have taken place
over the last few years, such as the inter-Korean summits, the U.S.-DPRK
summit, and Chinese-DPRK summits, a multilateral framework is not being favored
on the Korean Peninsula, and there remains an aversion to reinstituting the
six-party framework and other multilateral structures to discuss the future of
regional security cooperation.
There is a
perception that multilateralism (community building) could hurt the relative
gains made by each actor. North Korea fears that a multilateral framework will
be arrayed against the interests of the DPRK and will not be able to have a
neutral view. In contrast, the U.S. and Japan fear that a multilateral
framework would weaken the sanctions and create a space of peroration for North
Korea. Moreover, each of the states (or state-like entities in the case of
Taiwan) that could potentially participate in such a framework are determined
to structure a system that suits their individual needs and maximizes their
benefit. Establishing a framework neutral to regional priorities is a priority,
but this might also be the actual stumbling block in creating a genuinely
Northeast Asian mechanism. We could explore all wonderful, on paper, designs
for multilateralism. Still, no one of these would be stronger than the
willingness of the participants to compromise and surrender at least a minimum
on national sovereignty. This willingness is very low now, but this does not
reduce the necessity as bilateral mechanisms have also faced a stalemate.
Are we moving
beyond the stumbling blocks?
One of the
potential solutions to bridge the security gap in Northeast Asia could be to
expand the security structure to include Southeast Asia and expand the formula
to encompass East Asia. In particular, ASEAN could be beneficial given the region's
track record of inclusive and non-confrontational engagement. This said, ASEAN
has real and severe limitations but is still a semi-functional structure.
Furthermore, if ASEAN or a group of its member states were to take the lead in
restructuring the East Asian security balance, it would likely be perceived as
less threatening than if China, the U.S., or Japan would take the lead.
Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, etc., have all shown interest in being useful in
the Korean Peninsula. There is no lack of experience in creating softer security
cooperation, something that could be more useful than a formal security
mechanism in short to medium term. On the other side, many Southeast Asia
states have been caving in to Chinese pressure or poised to take a side against
China. The polarization of Southeast Asia, in terms how they view China, has not
been this high for a long time. This trend is maybe not too dissimilar to the
situation in the European Union that is also divided how to approach China.
Another
complicating factor that adds a challenge is that North Korea has no intentions
to denuclearize under the current political and economic situation. It would be
premature to assume that its complete denuclearization could be a short to
medium-term goal. A first step for the parties involved in designing a new
security balance is to manage economic sanctions and initiating a normalization
process. This should both de done with the U.S. that could lead to adequate
security guarantees for the North Korean regime, and with South Korea. This will
be a challenging situation to manage as that the main parties have no intention
to engage in multilateral frameworks due to geopolitical tensions and the
political benefits gained through bilateral engagements. This is further convoluted
because all regional players have proposals for regional security structures,
each designed with ambitions to dominate, or at least not be overlooked, by
other actors.
Bilateral
talks between the U.S. and DPRK will be essential for dealing with the nuclear
issue on the Korean Peninsula. However, it is not simply a question of
unilateral denuclearization for North Korea. Pyongyang is unlikely to
denuclearize unless some, if not all, of its demands on security and sanctions
are met. This even if the precise scope of these remains unspecified, and
possibly not even then will there be a denuclearization process. This is
especially true as the international community is divided on how to approach
North Korea, and DPRK has been able to balance this indecisiveness to its
advantage. The reality is that both states are hedging their bets and
overestimating the maneuvering space for their opponent while underestimating
the other side's strengths and unwillingness to compromise.
It would
moreover be a gross simplification to argue that the situation on the Korean
Peninsula is limited to the nuclear issue. It is much broader than that, but
even the "limited" scope of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
or just North Korea, provision of security assurances, lifting of sanctions,
and a formal end to the Korean War through a peace treaty are all issues in
which all regional actors have a stake. These issues require multilateral
agreements if they are to be managed to any worthwhile degree. Implications of
a failure, or success, in securing the denuclearization of the DPRK are thus
very much of regional and international importance. It is also vital to appreciate
that the process is so much more than simply a question of keeping or dismantling
nuclear components, even if the DPRK's arsenal takes a position of prominence
in the media and in the demands of some actors.
It is also
necessary to realize that bilateral frameworks can be more fragile than
multilateral and could be utilized as a part of a short-term political game
rather than a sustainable long-term security dialogue. While political
interests and unilateral agendas drive all political processes, these become
more diluted in a multilateral setting. This is not to say that the two
approaches are mutually exclusive: multilateral meetings need to go parallel
with bilateral meetings to support and reinforce the bilateral processes and
vice versa. Without a multilateral framework, it will be impossible to sustain
sanctions if negotiations break down. On the other hand, it is impossible to
lift international sanctions without multilateral consensus. It would also be challenging
to promote a sustainable approach to economic development without a more
comprehensive agreement. A regional mechanism would be more able to address
some of the issues of contention between Washington and Beijing, which will
prevent a long-term solution to the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Washington
and Beijing are both utilizing the Korean Peninsula for their political purpose.
Still, maybe, more importantly, Pyongyang will continue to maneuver between the
two Great Powers and play China and the U.S., as well as the smaller states,
against each other as they always do
Again, all of
this is not to dismiss bilateral negotiations, which are crucial, but rather to
indicate that there is a need to connect bilateral negotiations to the
longer-term need for multilateral frameworks. However, one bilateral
relationship is much more important for the Korean Peninsula than any other
relationship, and that is the one between China and the U.S.
Can we move
beyond the big two?
The challenge
I would like to end this presentation with is the two elephants in the
porcelain store - China and the U.S. Notably, every time Sino-U.S. relations
has been poor, the maneuver space and flexibility of the DPRK has increased,
and the current tension between the Great Powers has not been this high for a
very long time. The current Great Power tension has virtually nullified the
possibility to have any form of consistent pressure on North Korea's nuclear
development or to convince North Korea to engage in any meaningful dialogues.
On the contrary, the situation has enabled North Korea to play each actor
against each other with great skill. Despite the pandemic, North Korea has been
reasonably independent of China and Russia, despite that the pandemic could
have increased dependency. This signals that North Korea is potentially better of
economically and politically than what is sometimes perceived. Still, more
importantly, they have been able to maneuver in a way that has been beneficial
for North Korea. The reaching out to South Korea could be seen in this context
or as a backup for the pandemic that is a real threat to the North Korean
healthcare system.
Considering
the slight chance that the U.S. and China will manage to agree on a strategy
against North Korea, it is more likely that we will turn the clock back a
decade to a time when China refused to discuss North Korea with the U.S. Pyongyang
managed its economic and political security with support from China and Russia,
but at the same time flirting with the U.S. and South Korea to decrease Chinas
influence. Pyongyang understands the Korean Peninsula has strategic and political
value for both Beijing and Washington. It has been successful in increasing its
political independence due to this. Nevertheless, it is well worth noting that
North Korea has been surprisingly successful in balancing China, even if there have
been concerns raised from North Korea about the increased Chinese influence. That
said, both China and the U.S. are comfortable with status quo,
even if China has the most to gain from a changed security environment as the
U.S. seems to decrease its international engagement. The risks for both the U.S. and China are
high, and no one is likely to gamble with strategies that could go wrong.
Therefore, it
will be essential for smaller states such as Japan and South Korea attempt to
build relations with the EU, Australia, and other like-minded nations to influence
and engage North Korea on more flexible terms, even if the success of such
initiatives is very slim. The coming years seem to be characterized by a lack
of security architecture and a more assertive North Korea.
Concluding
remarks
There is no
easy way forward in the Korean Peninsula or in terms of regional security
cooperation at large. As long as the Sino-U.S. relations continue to be
strained, the expectations should be low. Nonetheless, there is a growing need
to find sustainable solutions to move from bilateral frameworks that exist
today to a multilateral framework that considers the multilateral needs and
concerns over time.
The future of
East Asia's security architecture remains open. Although many political,
economic, and social forces could impact the status quo, such mechanisms cannot
be sustained indefinitely. The past decade has seen an accelerating
appreciation for the interrelated nature of the region's economic and security landscapes,
and geo-strategic and business interests are becoming increasingly intertwined.
Multilateral and bilateral frameworks could lend themselves to building a new
kind of balance in the region. However, the two approaches will need to be
harmonized with one another and take into account the fragmented interests of
the various actors framing the political landscape of Northeast Asia.
However, at this
moment in time, this seems to be an unlikely development, and regional
commitments are more prominent on paper than concrete action designed to bridge
and cut through geopolitical self-interest. There is a growing need for all
actors to develop a regional framework that could generate stability over time,
but the willingness is low. The main challenge is the Sino-U.S. relations, and
the assertive behavior against many of its neighbors, not least Taiwan that
Beijing perceives as a reengage province, and the increased tensions
regionally.
Trust needs
to be rebuilt, and it is imperative that bilateral relations between the U.S.
and North Korea, but arguably more specifically between the two Koreas, are
maintained despite the reemerging tensions. All this said, the reality is that
despite good intentions, a regional framework is no more robust than the
political will to compromise and find a middle ground, something which appears
to be in short supply today, not least in the Great Power relations. The
reality is that we most likely will muddle through the coming few years, with a
Great Power rivalry, increased militarization of North Korea and the region at
large, and continued sanctions of North Korea. Still, as long as all parties
realize the limitations, the risks for military escalation could be mitigated.
Thanks for
listening,
Niklas
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