Teaming Up with Allies or
Partners:
China’s New Relationship
with North Korea
Shi Yinhong
Retired Distinguished
Professor of International Relations, Renmin University of China
Non-resident Professor of
Government and Public Policy, Nanjing University
Since the beginning 2018 when Donald Trump turned his
face to China and began to launch an increasingly comprehensive and intensified
China policy, one situation has increasingly developed and consolidated. That
is: although China still holds the principle of denuclearization of the
Peninsular, and that of implementing the UN Security Council’s sanction
resolutions against North Korea, but the US does not have the right cause to
expect China cooperate with it in its policy and advocacy over North Korea problem
when it has pressured China so harshly and damaged China’s interests in other
fields so severely. Does China still hold any important leverage to push North
Korea except that 4 million barrel raw oil per year provided jointly with
Russia and permitted by the Security Council? Should China abandon the limited
rapprochement with North Korea starting from Kim Jung Un’s first visit to China
in March 2018 and return to the previous situation in which Pyongyang was
increasingly likely to become Beijing’s permanent enemy? Could China make North
Korea “tamed” if China would really do in this way?A precondition for
substantial progress in the direction of denuclearization or major nuclear arms
reduction of North Korea is that the United States changes its basic approach
and do things according to the principle of “phased and synchronized” mutual
concessions. On this, China is at large not capable of helping the situation,
and is not willing to do so in the context of American comprehensive pressure
against China.
Since then, China has developed its new position over the
North Korea problem, somewhat like ROK and Russia. That is：(1) Keeping in principle the
objective of denuclearization of the Peninsular, but being no longer so
“radical” about it to damage severely the “new relationship” of “alliance minus”
as it were with Pyongyang; (2) Supporting the elimination of the legal state of
war and military confrontation between the North and South of the Peninsular
before any solution of the problem of nuclear arms; (3) Endorsing North Korea’s
demand that the UNSC sanctions and those imposed unilaterally by the US and
Japan must be substantially reduced at least. Beijing
will insist this new position, and try to address a major dilemma it is now
facing between complying with the UN Security Council sanction resolutions
against North Korea on one hand and providing some economic help to Pyongyang
on the other, for maintaining or even developing the new relationship mentioned
above.
Now, having suffered from Trump’s ten-months anti-China
hysteria since April 2020, and having met a Biden Administration whose China
posture has been essentially as hawkish as its predecessor and even more
comprehensive and pressure-reinforcing in terms of efficiency, China is forced
to incline toward a “core coalition building” including Russia, North Korea,
Iran, and a few other countries. And therefore there has remarkably emerged an
still ongoing process of polarization of the mainstream world politics into two
camps headed by US and China respectively with their “loyal associates” in very
limited numbers, more so on the Chinese side.
Between China and Russia, since late March an escalation
of their strategic partnership has been so prominent that a para-alliance in
strategic military sense formed and continue to strengthen. The most important
is the following events: In mid-June, probably with Russian urgings, China’s
Foreign Affairs Ministry declared that there is no ceiling to China-Russia
strategic cooperation; toward the end of that month, a joint statement by Xin
Jinping and Putin declared the extension of the effectiveness of the
China-Russia Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and the mutual support to
each other’s domestic and foreign policies without any reservation; In mid-July,
the Foreign Ministers of the two countries declared, according to Russian
official media, “the existing bilateral relationship (between China and Russia)
surpasses any interaction between nations during the Cold War era like
political-military alliances,” or China-Russia “comprehensive strategic
partnership” as officially called is not but better than alliance. Then during
August, the joint military drills of the two countries escalated to a new level
extraordinarily, including establishing a formal joint command for the drill,
using each other’s military equipment for a capability of arms interoperation,
and launching joint drills within Chinese mainland.
The signing in Teheran of a China-Iran agreement toward
the end of March for China’s investment of 400 billion USD in Iran, including
those for military cooperation, could be skipped off for brevity. So too China’s
rejection of any public criticism against the behavior of Myanmmar’s Junta in
overthrowing civilian parliamentary government and its bloodly suppression
against the massive pretest movement. The emphasis should be put on the new
major developments in China-DPRK relations. On March 22 Xi Jinping through the
head of International Department of CCP Central Committee told Kim Jong En via
North Korea’s new ambassador to China that “The Chinese side is willing to work
with the DPRK side and other related parties to stick to the direction of
political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue and preserve peace and
stability on the Peninsula.” Denuclearization of the peninsula, a major element
in every Chinese governmental statement on Peninsular since 2003, was
impressively not referred. And this significant omission has remained ever
since.
Moreover, according to North Korean official media KCNA,
in mid-July on the 60th anniversary of the alliance treaty between
China and DPRK Xi Jinping indicated to Kim Jong En through telegraph that “the
friendly and cooperative relationship between the two countries should be
constantly led to a new stage”. At the end of the same month, also according to
KCNA, telegraphs were exchanged again between these two leaders, emphasizing
that “both China and DPRK are socialist state led by Communist party.” In short
summary, China and North Korea have restored the alliance discourse and the
expression of ideological commonality, while denuclearization of the peninsula
has no longer been an element of China’s position and policy toward North
Korea.
Sea change? Of course. China’s North Korea policy has
been in a sense a function of China-US relations, which now are in
comprehensive and severe tension. The
highest diplomats of China and US face to face in Anchorage repeated their
respective fundamental positions, repeated numerous times in the past seven months.
That is: Any interference of China’s internal affairs is not tolerated at all vs.
Such interference is absolutely necessary and imperative. The latter
position is just what Secretary Blinken stated in the very beginning of the
Anchorage meeting: China’s behavior over the issues of Xinjiang, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, cyber attack and economic coercion against Australia “threaten the
rule-based order that maintains global stability. That’s why they’re not merely
internal affairs, and why we feel an obligation to raise these issues here
today.”
The
Biden Administration determines to deal with China “from a position of strength”.
That especially includes (1)rallying with allies and partners to check China
collectively, (2) closely connected with that, mobilizing issues of China’s
human rights situation and liberty and democratic values. At the same time,
China keeps its unquestionable hardliner position on its internal affairs,
strategic military buildup, strategic assertion in the western Pacific, and the
very broadly defined “rights of national development”. Moreover, as pointed
above, China is also building up its “core coalition”, including North Korea.
Great power rivalry has been so often symmetrical, rallying with allies and
partners a major instrument available for strengthening China’s “position of
strength”.
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