Rethinking
the Korean Armistice Structure in the East Asian Regional Context
Dr. Charles Armstrong
Professor of History (retired)
Columbia University
New York, USA
Paper Presented at 21st
World Korea Forum, Stockholm, Sweden, October 2021
The Korean War Armistice: An
Enduring but Limited Peace
The
Korean peninsula has been at the center of Great Power competition since the
term “geopolitics” itself was invented in Europe in the 1890s. Of course states on and
around the Korean Peninsula had struggled over dominance in Korea for
millennia, but with the rise of Russia, the US, and Japan as Pacific powers at
the end of the nineteenth century, multilateral rivalry over Korea began to
take its modern form. During the Cold War, an added dimension to this
geopolitical competition was the political division of Korea into North and
South. Since the end of active fighting in Korea in 1953, an armistice has kept
the two Koreas apart and maintained a tenuous and limited peace on the Korean
peninsula. Despite momentous changes in global and East
Asian regional politics over the last 70 years, the Korean War Armistice of July
1953 remains in place today. When it was signed, the Armistice Agreement was
intended as a temporary cease-fire to be followed by a peaceful negotiated
solution to Korean division. Specifically, Article IV recommended that the
countries involved in the conflict hold a political conference “within three
months” of signing the Agreement “to settle through
negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea,
the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.” The
purpose of armistices in modern warfare is to suspend hostilities in order for
the belligerent parties to work out a peace settlement, the classic example
being the First World War armistice, signed in November 1918 and succeeded by
the Versailles Peace Treaty in June 1919. Although a Korean peace conference
was delayed well beyond the three months recommended in the Armistice
Agreement, the Geneva Conference on Korea was finally convened in May 1954. But
the conference ended in June without any resolution. Korea, and the world, have
been living with the unresolved “Korean question” ever since.
The Armistice was designed for a geopolitical order
vastly different from that of today. The Cold War which gave rise to divided Korea
has been over for thirty years, and the post-Cold War period of US dominance
and globalization appears to be ending as well, giving way perhaps to a multipolar
world, a new US-China bipolarity, or something else again. The features of our
new post-post-Cold War era have yet to take clear shape. In addition to
global challenges such as climate change and pandemics like Covid-19, some of
the key elements relevant to the Korean question appear to be: 1) the rise of
China as a global economic and political actor rivalling the United States and
an increasingly assertive presence in the Asia-Pacific; 2) the corresponding
decline of US power in the world, and the centrality of US-China competition in
global affairs; 3) the reconfiguration of regional strategic concepts and
groupings, especially in the broader Asia-Pacific region, including the idea of
the “Indo-Pacific,” China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the “Quad” (US, Japan,
Australia and India), and most recently the Australia-UK-US security pact
(AUKUS); 4) the shifting roles and complex interactions of such actors as the
European Union, Russia, and the United Nations; 5) most critically, the greater
autonomy of the two Koreas in their
relations with one another and with external forces. It is this final element
that distinguishes Korea today from its dependent position during the age of
imperialism and the Cold War, and the far-reaching changes of contemporary
geopolitics may offer the Korean peninsula an opportunity to move beyond the
outmoded Cold War structure of the Armistice and work with regional and global
partners to replace the state of war with a state of peace – in other words, to
fulfill Article IV of the Armistice Agreement after seven decades of suspended
hostilities. History suggests that moments of shifting alignments such as the
world is witnessing today create environments in which the Korean question can
be addressed in new ways. Simply put, the Armistice should and can be replaced
by a peace agreement, as has been suggested by all sides of the Korean conflict
in recent years. Paradoxically this moment of US-Chinese tension might be a particularly
opportune time to do so.
Three Near-Breakthroughs
Since the breakdown of the Geneva talks in 1954,
there have been three key moments when the armistice system seemed on the verge
of significant change: first, during the early 1970s transformation of the Cold
War with Sino-US rapprochement and direct North-South Korea talks; second, in the
immediate post-Cold War period of North-South reconciliation in the early
1990s, culminating in the Basic Agreement of December 1991 and the
denuclearization agreement of February 1992, as well as the joint entry of
Pyongyang and Seoul into the UN, Chinese and Russian normalization with the
DPRK and a more limited reconciliation between the US and Japan and the DPRK;
and third, the summit diplomacy of 2018 – 19 between Seoul and Pyongyang and
between Washington and Pyongyang, reflecting a post-post-Cold War order
emerging around the Korean peninsula. None of these initiatives have brought
about a formal end to the Korean War, much less Korean unification, but each
has provided some of the potential building blocks for a new Korean peace
system that could supplant the decades-old war system represented by the
Armistice. The last of these moments, despite having lost momentum with the failure
of the US-DPRK summit in Hanoi in February 2019, is still not necessarily over.
At his speech before the UN General Assembly in September, President Moon
Jae-in reiterated his commitment to a declaration ending the Korean War, which
he claimed would “open the door to complete denuclearization and a permanent
peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” The
DPRK’s response, attributed to Kim Yo-jong of the Workers’ Party Central
Committee (and as Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un’s sister arguably the second-most
powerful leader in the country), supported the idea of an end-of-war
declaration in principle but criticized the other side for their
“double-dealing standards, prejudice and hostile policies toward the DPRK.” Nevertheless,
the DPRK was amenable to improving bilateral relations with the South, and both
sides expressed agreement on moving toward a peace agreement to end the state
of war between them. That is, the window that had opened in early 2018, with
the attendance of high-ranking DPRK officials (including Kim Yo-jong herself)
at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, remains open. There is an opportunity for
further opening with the next Winter Olympics, to be hosted by Beijing early
next year, in which all four key parties may have a chance to meet – providing
the US does not boycott the Beijing games, which remains a possibility. But it
is worth going farther back in history to examine closely two earlier openings,
which offer important lessons and building-blocks for the construction of a
peace system to transcend the current “war system” represented by the Korean armistice.
The first was the period of the
early 1970s, when the Cold War was rapidly shifting from a bipolar system of
blocs dominated by the US and the USSR to a more dynamic system, especially in
East Asia, in which China was a third major Cold War power. The story of
Seoul-Pyongyang negotiations, begun in secret in 1971 and culminating in the
first North-South Communique of 4 July 1972, is well-known. Less well-known are
the negotiations between China and the US, especially direct talks in New York
in 1973 and 1974, over transforming the armistice system. The two sides
discussed “alternative armistice arrangements,” including termination of the
United Nations Command (UNC), withdrawing all foreign forces from Korea
(meaning at this point South Korea), and handing operational control to
Pyongyang and Seoul. Internal US deliberations went further, proposing a “Shanghai-type
communique” pledging American support for one Korea (analogous to America’s
“one-China policy”) and a non-aggression pact between the two Koreas. Unfortunately, these
initiatives stalled over conflicting resolutions in the UN on the future of the
UNC in 1975, increasing US-DPRK tensions in 1976 and the breakdown of
North-South talks. However perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the
Sino-American talks on Korea was the fact that Koreans themselves were
excluded, as American and Chinese officials negotiated over the heads of their
Korean allies on matters of critical importance to the peninsula while Seoul
and Pyongyang negotiated in parallel. A more balanced four-party process
involving China, the US, and North and South Korea would not be initiated until
1997.
The second movement of near breakthrough
for the Korean Armistice system was twenty years later in the early 1990s, when
the Cold War itself was disintegrating and the two Koreas began direct peace
talks, culminating in the February 1991 North-South Basic Agreement on
Non-Aggression, Reconciliation, Exchange and Cooperation, and the February 1992
Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The problem
here was the opposite of the early 1970s: agreement between North and South
Korea, though an essential starting point, could not go into effect without the
direct involvement of their major allies – China and the US. The Basic
Agreement was tacitly supported by the Americans and Chinese, but this support never
progressed to the kind of multilateral agreement that could have ended the
state of war on the Korean peninsula. Most critically, North Korea’s nuclear
program became the focus of global and especially American attention from 1993
onward, and the nuclear issue overshadowed all talks on Korea involving the US,
including the 1997-99 Four-Party Talks and the Six-Party Talks of 2003– 9. Various
US administrations insisted that North Korea’s denuclearization was a
prerequisite to a peace agreement on the Korean peninsula. This only began to
change in the latter part of the Trump administration.
The events of 2018-19, reflecting
an emerging post-post-Cold War order, comprise the beginning of the third
moment of transformation that is still ongoing. The Pyeongchang Olympics paved
the way for an unprecedented three inter-Korean summit meetings in 2018 and a
historic US-DPRK summit in Singapore in June. The brief and somewhat vaguely
worded Singapore Declaration committed the US and DPRK to a new relationship
with each other and to joint efforts “to build a lasting and stable peace on
the Korean Peninsula.” Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was presented
as a goal, not a prerequisite for improved US-DPRK relations or, implicitly, a
peace agreement. The first few months after the Singapore Summit was a time of
visible if often symbolic progress toward peace, with the dismantling of guard
posts and removal of mines along the DMZ, and the first-ever appointment of a
non-US military official – the Canadian Lt. General Wayne Eyre – as deputy
commander of the UNC. However, the hopes of
Singapore were not fulfilled in the second US-DPRK summit in Hanoi in February
2019, talks cut short by the Americans who blamed the DPRK for demanding the
complete removal of sanctions (a claim disputed by DPRK officials). Progress in
US-DPRK and inter-Korean relations has been in a state of suspension ever
since.
Ending the “Forever War” in Korea
The
US remains the key external player in Korean peninsula affairs. So far it does
not appear that Korea is a top priority for the Biden Administration, and President
Biden has yet to build on the progress in US-DPRK relations made by his
predecessor. But neither has the relationship
gone back to the acrimony and mutual hostility of the past, and there are some
signs that progress may resume. Veteran diplomat Sung Kim, former
representative to the Six-Party Talks and ambassador to Seoul, was named
special envoy for North Korea in May 2021. Both Ambassador Kim and President
Biden have emphasized American commitment to resolving issues with the DPRK
through talks and diplomacy. For its part the DPRK has reiterated, most
recently in its official statement at the UN General Assembly, willingness to
improve relations with the US, provided the latter drop its “hostile policy”
toward Pyongyang and deal with the DPRK on a reciprocal basis.
Both before and after coming to
office, President Biden pledged to end America’s “forever war” in Afghanistan. Biden kept his word and
withdrew US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, twenty years after the
initial American invasion. The conflict in Korea has lasted far longer, from
the summer of 1950 until today, suspended by a seven-decade cease-fire. Winding
down the “forever war” in Korea need not precipitate the kind of chaos seen in
post-conflict Afghanistan: there is already a structure upon which a Korean
peace can be built, and all parties to the conflict have agreed in principle to
work toward a peaceful solution to the conflict. An initial step toward a
“lasting and stable peace regime” as articulated by the Singapore Declaration
would be an agreement formally ending the Korean War. As in the US-China
discussions of the 1970s, “alternative armistice arrangements” can replace the
current UN Command, demilitarize the Joint Security Area, and devolve
operational control to the Koreans. Direct North-South talks such as those that
led to the 1991 Basic Agreement, an agreement still theoretically supported by
all relevant parties (including the US), would be another key element. This
would lead to an agreement to replace the 1953 Armistice with a peace mechanism
signed on by the major parties to the conflict – North and South Korea, China,
and the US – and supported by the United Nations and other countries. This
transition from an armed truce to a genuine peace would finally fulfill the key
objective of the Korean War Armistice: “the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.” Given the vast
political differences between the two Korean states that show no sign of
converging any time soon, the goal of peaceful political unification is
unrealistic in the near term. More plausible is a formal end to the state of
war, followed by a process of interaction, integration, and long-term
unification.
Many obstacles remain, of course,
including the recent “missile competition” between North and South Korea, with
the South developing new submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the North
rail-based launchers. US-ROK joint military
exercises have been resumed, despite a strong rebuke from the DPRK. North-South
relations are stalled for now, as are US-DPRK relations. Particularly troubling
is the growing confrontation between the US and China, whose cooperation is
essential for peace on the Korean peninsula. But the rivalry between the US and
China, a relationship likely to shape international politics for many years to
come – not least on the Korean peninsula – may in fact help facilitate a
multilateral peace agreement for Korea. As China and the US confront each other
across many sectors globally and in several areas of the Asia-Pacific
(including the East and South China Seas and the Taiwan Straits), Korea is one
place where there is a long history of US-China negotiations, a track record of
agreements, and a strong interest on the part of all parties to reach a
peaceful settlement to one of the world’s longest-lasting conflicts.
Charles K.
Armstrong and John B. Kotch “Sino-American Negotiations on Korea and
Kissinger’s UN Diplomacy,” Cold War
History vol. 15, no. 1 (February 2015), pp. 7 - 9.
|
