Tasks and Prospects for Establishing
Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula:
Roles and Responsibilities in the U.S., China and
Russia Triangle
A paper
for the 22nd World Korea Forum
Stockholm,
October 25-26, 2021
Dr.Alexander
Zhebin
Director
Center for Korean
studies
Institute of Far
Eastern Studies
Moscow, Russia
alexzheb1948@gmail.com
Abstract
Russia, China and the U.S. have not yet abandoned
the common goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. However, the
author argues, fierce geopolitical rivalry between the U.S. and China,
deteriorating relations between Moscow and Washington caused by rusofobian
instincts of American bi-partisan elite shocked by Russia’s resurrection after
the USSR collapse and, finally, different vision of the unified Korea’s place
in future security architecture in East Asia, make chances for genuine and
productive cooperation between the U.S., China and Russia on Korea very slim.
Key words: Russia, China, the U.S., Korean peninsula,
security, nuclear problem
1. US-DPRK: In Search for a New Dialogue Platform
On April 30, 2021, White House Press
Secretary Jen Psaki announced that the Biden administration had finally
completed its review of North Korea policy. The policy, in particular, calls
for “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”. The US decided to
build on Singapore agreement reached by Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in 2018.
In the U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint
Statement adopted at the summit on May 21, 2021 in Washington President Moon
Jae-in in fact endorsed the US new approach by stating that he “welcomes the conclusion of the United States’ DPRK policy review, which takes a
calibrated and practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy
with the DPRK to make tangible progress that increases the security of the
United States and the Republic of Korea”. [U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement].
Both leaders also reaffirmed their our common belief that “diplomacy and dialogue, based on
previous inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK commitments such as the 2018 Panmunjom
Declaration and Singapore Joint Statement, are essential to achieve the
complete denuclearization and establishment of permanent peace on the Korean
Peninsula”. [U.S.-ROK
Leaders’ Joint Statement].
However, no specific plans or
roadmap for resolving the nuclear issue were presented by the U.S. up to the
present day. Meanwhile, many analysts, including those in the United States,
argue that it is the unrealistic policy by the U.S. to insist on the DPRK
completely giving up its "deterrent forces" while delaying any
meaningful reciprocal steps.
Among Pyongyang's demands to
Washington, the priority is likely to be given to security guarantees and
building of new relations with the United States. If we briefly summarize the
content of such relations, then, according to Pyongyang, they should be
characterized by the complete elimination of the military, primarily nuclear
threat to the DPRK from the United States (and according to North Korean vision
of such elimination). This also includes the U.S. stopping all hostile actions
against the DPRK, which includes not only giving up joint military drills near
the DPRK's borders, but also the lifting of sanctions which are viewed as an
indisputable manifestation of hostility.
Especially noteworthy is a renewal
demand by Pyongyang to withdraw the U.S. troops from the peninsula. The
statement made by North Korea top leader’s sister, Kim Yo Jong “upon
authorization” (needless to explain whose nod she got for it) is remarkable
because it is rather flatly denies allegations by some American officials and
experts to the effect that Pyongyang tacitly complies with continuing
stationing of the U.S. troops on the peninsula and even is interested in their
deployment [Kim Yo Jong, Vice-department…].
Taking into account the above-mentioned
position of the DPRK and the reluctance of the United States to take measures
that would satisfy North Korea’s security and economic concerns thus
encouraging the country to start dismantling her nuclear facilities, the best
way to prevent the further build-up and improvement of North Korea’s nuclear
arsenal and means of delivery could be a replacement of denuclearization as an
immediate task by arms control measures on the Korean Peninsula.
After the unsuccessful DPRK-US
summit in February 2019 in
Hanoi, the DPRK continued to develop its nuclear and missile programs. If
during period of 8 years – two terms of Barack Obama presidency – the DPRK
conducted 61 missile tests, then in two years after the meeting in Hanoi, more
than 30 launches took place [Cha].
The DPRK's determination to build up
"means of self-defense” was confirmed by Kim Jong-un in his speech at the
military parade on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the WPK in October
2020 and in the report of the WPK Central Committee to the 8th Congress of the
party in January 2021 [Great Program for Struggle…]
Exactly these DPRK successes in
strengthening its "deterrent forces» made a number of well-known U.S. experts
and former high-ranking government officials to admit that the denuclearization
of the DPRK is a" mission impossible " and to call for the
normalization of relations with the country as a condition for achieving
progress in negotiations on its denuclearization. Such a position, in
particular, is held by the former U.S. Secretary of Defense W.Perry [Lee
Je-hun].
The Biden administration which
employs many people who had worked in previous U.S. administrations, sooner or
later will have to realize that each stage of denuclearization should be
accompanied by the elimination of the DPRK concerns about what Pyongyang call
the "hostile policy" of the United States, namely, American efforts
to undermine security, political and social stability in the DPRK.
Threat reduction implies, among
other things, the implementation of arms control and arms limitation measures
and even the need for mutual deterrence as a condition for implementing
measures to reduce the threat of war. The second necessary element of arms
control is the establishment of as normal relations as possible between the
states contracting to such control. Neither the first nor the second component
of such a regime between the United States and the DPRK is yet visible.
However, during the Singapore
U.S.-DPRK summit in 2018, according to Ankit Panda, a well-known American
expert, Kim Jong-un showed interest in negotiations on arms control, and not in
discussions aimed at achieving unilateral disarmament of the DPRK [Panda].
Such a course does not mean that its
end result will be the complete denuclearization of the DPRK. Having
strengthened the security of its nuclear forces through agreements on reducing
mutual threats, the DPRK is unlikely to agree to complete elimination of its
nukes and missiles.
The latter looks ever more
unrealistic in view of the ROK termination of its Revised Missile Guidelines
and Biden’s acknowledging the decision at the last week’s U.S.-ROK summit [U.S.-ROK Leaders’
Joint Statement].
North Korea is seemingly not among
top priority issues for Biden. Meanwhile, working on incremental steps, both
sides could maintain a complete denuclearization already agreed in Singapore
Joint Statement and other documents, as a final goal, similar to the ideals of
general and complete disarmament, approved by the international community in
the UN General Assembly resolution of November 21, 1962.
It is highly likely that the
transition to a such method of the settlement of the nuclear problem could lead
to the resumption of the negotiation process, mutual concessions, including
reductions in the level of military-political confrontation, partial or
large-scale lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for North Korea's
restrictions of its nuclear weapon and missile systems.
The Biden administration's choice of
such a course for settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem would mean
recognition of the DPRK's status as a de facto nuclear power, which Pyongyang
has long sought. The United States will have to make a difficult choice: to
return to de-facto Obama’s “strategic patience” policy augmented by Trump’s
"maximum pressure", which both did not bring the desired results, or
to embark on a more realistic path that takes into account current geopolitical
and regional realities.
2. The Korean Peninsula and the U.S. –
China Relations
The U.S.
policy toward the Korean Peninsula is prompted mainly by geopolitical
considerations. The non-proliferation agenda was and remains an auxiliary issue
subordinated to the U.S. geopolitical goals in East Asia. Any real détente in
Korea, the more so normalization of relations between the U.S. and the DPRK, or
between North and South Korea inevitably would call into question the U.S.
military presence on the peninsula. The
U.S. troops withdrawal from South Korea could lead to the same developments in
Japan. It would have removed a cornerstone of the U.S. strategy in East Asia
and in the Asia-Pacific as a whole, since the strategy is based on the
bilateral military alliances with Japan and the ROK and the forward deployment
of the U.S. armed forces in these countries.
Besides,
normalization of relations between the U.S. and the DPRK or radical improvement
of inter-Korean relations would have led to disappearance of the so-called
“North Korean missile threat”. The development, in its turn, would have
deprived the U.S. of the last more or less serious argument justifying
deployment of the THAAD in the region.
Therefore the United States are interested either in
maintaining a tension on the peninsula
at the level, justifying deployment of
the U.S. troops and THAAD system, or, at the best of cases, in bringing about a
regime change in the DPRK. The latter scenario would allow the U.S. to spread its
control over the whole of the Korean Peninsula – a EA region of unique
military-strategic value which is located on a joint of borders of Russia and
China. The advancement of the U.S. armed forces with their precision weapons of
new generation right on Korea overland borders with China and Russia would
bring about cardinal changes into military-political situation in East Asia and
in the Asia-Pacific region.
To
understand China's position it is necessary to take into consideration that
China and Korea are neighbors for period of several thousand years. Till the 20th
century Korea was included in China's traditional sphere of influence. The last
100 years-long break means nothing from China's vision of history and its
long-term interests on the peninsula and in the region when compared with
previous 5,000 years and maybe the same period in the future.
In
spite of an on-going debate within Chinese leadership and among foreign policy
experts on North Korea’s value for China, it is unlikely that even
post-communist China, to say nothing of the present-day one, which is
preserving the socialist system and the ruling role of the Communist Party,
will agree to the situation when it finds the unified Korea under political and
economic control of the United States - China's major rival in the current
Asia-Pacific Century. However it will be exactly the case if North Korea collapses
in the near future.
China,
irrespective of Russia or any other Power's position, prefers, at least for the
time being, to keep North Korea afloat as buffer zone between herself and the
U.S. forward deployment forces on Asia’s mainland. For China to lose North
Korea equals to losing the second Korean War with possible subsequent
stationing of the U.S. troops on the Yalu River. The prospect is absolutely
unacceptable in view of both the U.S. current policy toward China and Beijing's
plans concerning Taiwan and South China Sea.
Moreover,
such development is fraught with serious negative consequences for China's
current international standing and future place in Asia. Which of the small or middle
powers on the perimeter of the Chinese borders will rely on China as an ally or
protector, if Beijing, as they say, without a single shot, will surrender to
the U.S. the Korean Peninsula which for centuries remained in the sphere of
exclusive influence of China. Beijing is hardly expected acting like that.
Chinese
protection, like it happened in the 1950s and in many other cases earlier
during previous centuries, may well be extended over the DPRK's territory. For
North Korean leaders and nomenclature
as a social group will be much more preferable and safer to return to the old
traditional relations with China - the 21st century's superpower, -
than to find themselves - at best of chances - in a South Korean prisons or
re-education camps.
Beijing realizes very well the
negative consequences liquidation of the DPRK can bring about for the PRC,
especially in view of unfolding American-Chinese competition or, if we use a more proper word, rivalry for a
leading role in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore China, despite her displeasure
with some of Pyongyang's moves, cannot afford to lose North Korea.
Five summits between China and DPRK
leaders held during 2018-2019 along with recent unprecedentedly frequent visits
by Kim Jong-un to cemeteries and monuments dedicated to Chinese volunteers
fought side-by-side with the North Koreans during the Korean War spoke volumes
about China’s stance for those who have an elementary knowledge about meaning
of such symbolic gestures in Oriental politics.
The U.S.
understands that any attempt to take hold of what China considers its sphere of
influence for hundreds of years would lead to a major quarrel with the world’s
largest country and with another world civilization - Confucian one. For the
time being, the U.S. seemingly prefers to evade
a risk of a major conflict with China over North Korea.
Therefore the U.S. is trying to
lure the Chinese by promises that after the DPRK's "disarmament" will
be concluded, the U.S. forces will not be stationed in the North and return to
the south of the 38th parallel, or that American strikes will be
limited only to the North Korean nuclear facilities. At the same time the U.S.
tries to sow alienation and mistrust between China and North Korea,
particularly by compliments to Chinese concerning a "constructive
role" allegedly played by Beijing to solve the nuclear problem. With
advent of the Trump administration the traditional pile of “carrots and sticks”
toward China was supplemented by “secondary sanctions” and new rounds of trade
war. That course was upheld by the Biden administration.
Washington is actively
exploiting Beijing's desire to avoid direct confrontation with the United
States and to preserve a peaceful situation on its borders. The United States
exerts enormous pressure on China, trying to force it to participate in the
economic strangulation of the DPRK, and at the same time to show the world that
the Americans are capable to force Beijing to act as the United States wishes,
even in relations with countries which are China’s neighbors or even allies.
This is how the role of “responsible stakeholder” looks like, which Washington
would like to impose on Beijing.
The United States also try to
involve China into the planning of coordinated actions in the event of some
emergency in the DPRK, by which the West understands the collapse of the
regime. I think the Chinese do not believe the promises of the Americans that
in this case the United States will not expand its military presence in the
Northern part of the peninsula, but will only limit itself to the search and
removal of North Korean WMD. Beijing is unlikely unaware of similar promises
made to the Soviet leadership about the NATO non-expansion to the East and
compares them with the current realities in Europe.
Beijing, apparently, will try
henceforth to employ all political and diplomatic methods available as well as
economic resources necessary to ensure the DPRK's survival. At the same time
China will encourage North Korea in every possible way to exercise restraint in
foreign policy and to go on with economic transformations which would lessen
political and economic burden for China to support the regime in Pyongyang.
3. The Korean Problem: A
View from Russia
Russia was active participant of the
Six-Party talks on the issue of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula
and proved of being capable to find solutions to very complicated problems
emerged during a negotiation process, as, for example, “Banko Delta Asia” case.
Those who were inclined to accuse Moscow of being “passive” just don’t
comprehend that Russia has its own vision for methods which were necessary for
achieving progress at the talks.
Russia also welcomed all moves by
two Korean states aimed at relaxation of
tension and promoting inter-Korean cooperation because of two major
considerations: Moscow hopes that the inter-Korean reconciliation, firstly,
will remove a threat of military conflict right next to her Eastern borders,
and secondly, promote more favorable environment for both development of
Russia’s bilateral economic ties with two Korean states as well as for
implementation of multilateral economic projects with Russia’s participation in
Northeast Asia.
Russia's firm conviction is that there is no alternative to the
inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. Moscow never failed to confirm that
"Russia supports the policy of developing dialogue between the two Korean
states and bringing them closer together" and that "Russia has always
aspired to, and today expresses its unequivocal support for, a dialogue and
rapprochement of the Korean states and maintaining a denuclearized Korean
peninsula." [Titarenko M. Russia and Her Asian Partners…]
Better relations between South and North Korea completely suit
Russia's national interests because tension arising from time to time between
Pyongyang and Seoul blocks realization of multilateral economic projects, like
oil and gas pipelines, linking the Russian Trans-Siberian Mainline with the
Trans-Korean railways. Russia believes that cooperation in a tripartite format,
between Russia, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, in the energy and transportation sectors can be a very important part of
expanding bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Seoul. This is consistent
Russia’s position since Mr. Putin’s first presidential term.
Improvement of relations between the
DPRK and the ROK, along with providing with more favorable conditions for
development of trade and economic cooperation between Russia and both parts of
Korea, undoubtedly, would open new opportunities for economic development of
the Russian Far East and for linking its economy to integration processes in
the Asia-Pacific region.
Besides being economically advantageous, such interaction is
highly likely to contribute to the confidence-building between South and North
Korea. Russia believes strongly that trilateral cooperation "will not only
be economically advantageous, but will also increase trust on the Korean
peninsula."
In spite of certain disappointment
in Pyongyang caused by Moscow’s support for UNSC resolutions sanctioning the
DPRK during 2013-2017, both countries manage to maintain a rather intensive
high-level political exchanges between all branches of power- executive,
parliamentary, judiciary. Those contacts culminated in Kim Jong Un’s trip in
April of 2019 to Vladivostok where he had talks with President Vladimir Putin.
Moscow believes that North Korea’s
decision to refrain from nuclear tests and ICBM launches along with some other
conciliatory steps should be rewarded by lifting at least some sanctions,
especially those which negatively influence people’s living and hinder economic
development. Pressing other countries to strictly abide with North
Korea-related UNSC resolutions, the U.S. is somehow “forgetting” that the same
resolutions directly call for lifting of sanctions if the DPRK undertakes such steps. During the
whole period Russia continued to provide humanitarian assistance to the
country.
Biden administration’s decision to
use “calibrated, practical diplomacy” for dealing with North Korea can be
viewed as a proof of relevance of the ideas and later, a roadmap proposed by
Moscow together with Beijing, starting from July 2017. However/
Moscow-Washington cooperation in resolving the nuclear issue in Korea will certainly suffer setback in case of
further deterioration of U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations.
Speaking
on Nov.24,2020 in Kremlin at the ceremony for receiving letters of credence from newly
arrived DPRK ambassador Sin Hong Chol, the Russian President said that “we favor further consolidation of neighborly relations with
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.”. He added that Russia is
“ready to continue developing the entire range of bilateral
ties, as we agreed during the Russia-North Korea summit in Vladivostok
in April 2019”.
He also reconfirmed Moscow position for the solution of
the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula: “this problem must be
resolved only by diplomatic efforts, through negotiations”. [Ceremony for presenting …]
4. Outlines of the U.S.-China-Russia Compromise in Korea
History of the Korean settlement for the last
30 years, including time and again encountered difficulties in solving the
nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, makes us to conclude that without
solution of a certain fundamental problem, directly related to the region’s
future security architecture as a whole, we will continue incessantly stumble
on minor problems and will not be capable to tackle them.
The fundamental, key issue which any future
peace process in Northeast Asia should to resolve is defining an acceptable for
all four “big countries” – China, Russia,
the U.S. and Japan - place for the
future united Korea in the regional security system. Many politicians and
experts in the U.S.A., the ROK and Japan have already listed the re-unified
Korea as a member of the tripartite alliance of U.S.-Japan-ROK, to which
Australia has been already linked by a number bilateral agreements.
However, such vision is unlikely to satisfy
Moscow and Beijing. Both countries are likely to perceive such a union as a deterrent
against Russia and China. Such alliance would be tantamount to the emergence on
Russia’s eastern borders of a body similar to NATO, under the umbrella of THAAD
system which is actively deployed by the U.S. and their allies both in Europe
and in East Asia.
At the same time, the DPRK stands for the
establishment of a neutral non-aligned state on the Korean peninsula. The
approach looks like, in terms of ensuring the security of Russia and China,
more attractive than some experts’ insistence on the need to maintain the U.S.
military presence on the peninsula even after Korea unification.
Calculations to the effect that a future united
Korea will be de-facto a forward base of maritime powers - the United States
and Japan - against continental - China and Russia - can hamper and is already
hindering the cooperation among the
U.S., China and Russia for solution of the nuclear problem, creation of a
reliable and sustainable peace system in Northeast Asia, and achievement the
re-unification of Korea.
5. Conclusion
The U.S. attempts to get unilateral
geopolitical advantages in East Asia, first of all on the Korean Peninsula make
chances for productive U.S.-China-Russia’ trilateral cooperation very slim.
The on-going suspension of negotiating process on the
nuclear problem provide South and North Korea with unique chance through their
own combined efforts to size leadership in removing threat of another major
conflict, promoting peace and common
prosperity. Three inter-Korean summits of 2018 confirmed that the inter-Korean
dialogue has a huge potency to become a major engine for promoting security and
stability on the Korean peninsula. The dialogue is vitally necessary to improve
the current uneasy situation on the peninsula.
The best option for the Koreans would be to resume
working on implementation of the bilateral agreements and understandings
reached between South and North Korea at the various talks and contacts held
during several previous decades, including those agreed upon at the three
historical inter-Korean summits held in 2018. It is high time for the Koreans
both in the North and in the South to take its nation’s destiny in their own
hands.
Russia hopes that the unified Korea will become her good
neighbor and a major economic partner. Emergence of such an actor in the region
is perceived as favorable for Russia since it would broaden her policy options
in Northeast Asia.
Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, approved by President Vladimir
Putin in 2016, states that “Russia is interested in maintaining traditionally
friendly relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the
Republic of Korea, and will seek to ease confrontation and de-escalate tension
on the Korean Peninsula, as well as achieve reconciliation and facilitate intra-Korean
cooperation by promoting political dialogue.”[ Foreign Policy Concept…]
References
Ceremony for presenting foreign ambassadors’
letters of credence. Moscow, Kremlin. November
24, 2020. URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64486
(accessed: 4 Aug., 2021).
Cha,Victor (2020). Engaging North Korea Anew. Foreign
Affairs. URL: https://fam.ag/3uBT1QX (accessed: 6 May, 2021).
Foreign Policy Concept
of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation
Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016). URL:https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248(accessed: 10 Aug., 2021).
Great Programme for
Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory. On
Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at 8th Congress of WPK.
URL:
http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?lang=eng&ptype=cforev&stype=2&ctype=3&mtype=view&no=32399(accessed: 15 May,
2021).
Kim Yo Jong, Vice-department Director of WPK Central Committee, Issues
Press Statement. KCNA,10.08.2021.URL:http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.article.retrieveNewsViewInfoList.kcmsf;jsessionid=45C31354A7E32A3DF83FE7B98929A472#this (accessed: 11 Aug., 2021).
Lee
Je-hun (2020). S.
Korean, US experts say Washington needs to guarantee regime security and
normalize relations with Pyongyang to progress in denuclearization
negotiations. Hankyoreh. URL: https://bit.ly/3ewKCZt (accessed: 10 May,
2021)
Panda,
Ankit (2021). What
Biden Should Know About North Korea’s New Nuclear Plans. Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace. URL: https://bit.ly/3uDZzyI
(accessed: 29 April, 2021).
Titarenko M. Russia and Her Asian Partners in
Globalizing World. Strategic Interaction: Problems &Prospects. Forum Publishing House. Moscow. 2012. p. 471.
U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement. MAY 21,
2021 • STATEMENTS AND
RELEASES. URL;
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/(accessed: 22 June,
2021).
|
