I
Russia has always been a major factor in China’s external strategy, whether in the sense of policy calculation or in that of policy practice. Having left out a long, centuries-old related history and taken into account of China-US rivalry as a major context, one could easily find that especially shortly after the Russian annexation of Crimea China-Russia strategic/military cooperation had already escalated along with intensifying of both Russia-US and China-US strategic antagonisms.
The escalation began with a delicate transformation shortly after March 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea mentioned above. Looked at President Xi’s statements respectively to Presidents Putin and Obama reported by Xinhua News Agency and China’s voting behavior on Ukraine crisis at the UN security council, one would believe that in the first weeks a little priority had even been put upon the principles of non-secession and non interference rather than the strategic friendship with Russia. China took a neutral position, and Xi seemed to determine to keep it in the predictable future. At that time, tilting remarkably toward Russia could obtain some short-term interests for China, but might make it lose even more in its overall diplomatic position and creditability in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, as well as in Europe. By the way, Russia's neutrality in the China-Japan confrontation then had already demonstrated the limitation of China-Russia strategic partnership, and Beijing's initial position on the Ukraine crisis is demonstrating it further.
However, Russian annexation of Crimea is a fait accompli unable to be reversed, and Beijing’s interest in the strategic partnership with Moscow became increasingly a necessity perceived by the former in its intensified rivalry with Washington driven by President Obama’s “rebalancing” in Asia-Pacific. Before long China reduced frequency and loudness in the United Nations in referring to states’ sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-violence in dealing with international disputes when Ukraine crisis discussed, and maintained more determinedly its position to oppose western sanctions against Russia because of the crisis.
Things went quickly for strengthening strategic cooperation between Beijing and Moscow, with Washington provided dynamics by its increasingly tougher approaches toward these two antagonists respectively. The Russian export to China of advanced military equipment and technology accelerated, together with China-Russia joint military drills conducted in the Mediterranean and Sea of Japan. More importantly, Presidents Xi and Putin issued on late-June 2016 a joint declaration on global strategic stability, condemning US-sponsored missile defense system as a threat against the joint will and strategic security of China and Russia. About two months after the Hague international tribunal of arbitration issued its adjudication on South China Sea, which was condemned by China as a scrap of paper, China and Russia launched a joint navy and air-force exercise in that maritime area, where Beijing and Washington had their particularly intensifying strategic rivalry and the most prominent confrontation at the time. Characterized by these two developments, the joint declaration and the joint military exercise South China Sea, one could regarded the “China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”, as the two governments has labeled, had escalated for a while to (or very near to) the level of a para-military-alliance in the first time in decades.
II
Then Trump appeared at the stage of world politics as US President. Though in the surprisingly wonderful atmosphere of China-US relations during and after Xi-Trump Mar-a-Lago Summit in April 2017 Xi did not refer to the strategic/military cooperation with Russia as usual when he met Putin in Beijing in May, and China took a voting mode different from that of Russia toward the draft resolution on Syria in the UN Security Council, an extraordinary phenomenon in relations with Russia indicating a little alienation, but that was a quite temporary aberration ended quickly after Trump turned his face against China in a short time-span less than three months.
Toward the end of that year, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America was published by White House. China along with Russia were defined as US’s rivals, which “challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity....determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.” One month later, Pentagon published 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, stipulating from military angle the strategy of “retaining the U.S. strategic competitive edge relative to China and Russia”. The year 2018 began with the historic dramatic expansion of intensifying China-US rivalry from strategic to trade and then political/ideological fronts, having all increasingly severe confrontations at all the three. As to Russia, in despite of personal and consistent “bromance” between Trump and Putin, stronger antagonism and partisanship subverted any attempt for a national rapprochement and avoidance of increase sanction against Moscow. Therefore resulted more amicable and frequent warm communication between Xi and Putin.
III
Then, most drastically, there has been a coronavirus pandemic. Coronavirus pandemic decides. Indeed, many countries and peoples in the world admire China’s triumph over COVID-19 epidemic at home, appreciate that in terms of the strengths of its totally centralized political/social systems, and welcome public health assistance from China in their epidemic jeopardy, which has become a new priority of the Chinese foreign policy with the promotion of propaganda on the claimed superiority of the “China Mode”. However, perhaps partly because of these, there seems to be a drastic potential alienation between Russia and China which has been demonstrated by the three-months lack of the previously routine frequent warm communication between each other’s top leader until April 16 when it was declared that they had a phone conversation to express mutual support. There emerged a new Chinese COVID-19 hot-spot, the Chinese border city Suifenhe, roughly 75 miles from the Russian port city of Vladivostok. It seemed to raise tensions between two allies, while the Russian authorities in Primorsky Krai, the border region, announced that they planned to return the stranded Chinese though the Chinese consulate said the announcement was inaccurate.
On the other hand, President Putin made as many as four hot-line calls with President Trump in two weeks beginning on March 30, discussed the joint efforts to combat the coronavirus pandemic and stabilization of global energy markets, followed by his rare joint statement with Trump on April 26 commemorating a 1945 World War II link-up of US and Soviet troops on their way to defeat Nazi Germany as an example of how their countries can cooperate. “Putin leverages coronavirus chaos to make a direct play to Trump,” “Trump and Putin issued rare joint statement promoting cooperation”, and “Russia wants to team up with U.S. to ‘fight against’ coronavirus pandemic” were prominent titles of report in western medias.
Whether these new developments in Russia-US relations will be proved as the beginning of a new normal or a temporary aberration, the stark contrast with China-US relations is what one has never seen since at least more than a decade ago. The American jealousy and antagonism toward China are inveterate, and now are even further aggravated by its nation-wide resent against the so-called Chinese “cover-up” and “disinformation”, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed as late as April 13 that there will be a settling accounts afterward about the origin of the pandemic, making a thorough inquiry. The most recent development in this respect is that the US Defense Intelligence Agency updated its assessment of the origin of the novel coronavirus in a classified report on April 27 titled “China: Origins of COVID-19 Outbreak Remain Unknown”. It claimed that it is possible the novel coronavirus emerged “accidentally” due to “unsafe laboratory practices” in Wuhan.
Moreover, the expanding selective decoupling emerged drastically since launching of China-US trade war by Trump in July 2018 has developed further speedily, both physical and psychological, under the strong impact of the pandemic, with the disruption of global supply chains and draconian restriction of international travel only as its most prominent symbol. A China more confident of, or more depending on, total centralization of state power and a US confused about the effectiveness of its constitutional liberal democracy, under a President never really believing that, will go further apart, engaging the rivalry between them in an intensity greater than ever before since 1972 in longer terms, toward an ominous future.
IV
It is uncertain that what kind of mutual relationship China and Russia would have in the future, under the impacts of coronavirus pandemic and transforming world political economy. Some major elements in the previous relations between Beijing and Moscow will surely still there, including requirements for a safe extra-long border, a perennial geo-strategic imperative to avoid confrontation at two major fronts, a dependence of China on Russia’s military hardware and that of Russia on China’s financial support, and a relative delicacy of any major rapprochement made with respectively with the US. Besides, the two countries still hold common position in some major issues in world politics, the most prominent one now is their consistent joint appeal in the UN Security Council to relax and reduce the sanctions against DPRK since early 2018.
However, some of these elements could be changed somewhat in the dynamic world political economy, which has become more dynamic in an ominous direction because of the pandemic. Other elements, the negative one factual or potential, will also be perennial or nearly so. The most important ones among them could be Russia’s “inferior complex” as a past superpower, China’s “triumphalism” as the would-be superpower, the Russia’s “sphere of influence” interests in Central Asia, its traditional special relationship with Vietnam and India, two countries often behavior like China’s partial antagonists, together with China’s emerging special relationship with some Eastern European countries, toward which Russia has no good feeling at all. Besides, the Machiavellism in Russia’s traditional political/strategic culture as well as in the Chinese one in perhaps lesser degree, Russian state’s Shylock-like manner in commercial negotiations, and historical bad memories toward Russia kept in China’s national consciousness could also play negative role.
V
Having referred to political economy, Russia in China’s “strategic economy” has to be discussed. Three things come to the fore: Russian energy supplied to China; Infrastructure investment of China within Russia, and Belt of the “Silk Road” through the land mass of Eurasia, which is obviously more feasible than the much more strategically sensitive of the Maritime “Silk Road” component of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). China’s huge economy depends on Russian energy supply, as it depends on a few other major overseas energy sources, more than anything Russia depends on China. And this situation will not change in essence in any short-term future at the least, similar with the import of Russian advanced military hardware. Infrastructure investment of China within Russia has been perceived by Beijing as economically profitable in longer term and diplomatically near-imperative all the times. The Belt of the “Silk Road” through the land mass of Eurasia has to be permitted by Moscow at least, and been expected to be enormously beneficial to Beijing’s long-term interests in all the perceivable dimensions if it could obtain Moscow’s active cooperation. In a word, Russia is quite important in China’s “strategic economy” , with various positive implications to the latter’s strategic power, diplomatic influence, and required prestige.
However, here are also complexities. Moscow has charged quite high price for its energy supply, much higher than that in international energy market, and so are the prices for acceptance of major projects of Beijing’s infrastructure investment when its foreign exchange reserve is shrinking. Russia’s financial capacity and low level of marketization are fundamental hurdles to sustainable economic cooperation, matters having no substantial prospect of much improvement in the predictable future. Geopolitical and geo-economic sensitivity held by Russia about Central Asia has often made China hesitated or conservative in pushing BRI in Central Asian republics, worrying that too much exertion would bring about strong Russian reaction.
It should be pointed out that faults have often been in China’s side in the case of difficulties BRI faces from Russia. Not sufficiently recognizing that one should do more and say less, the Chinese ballyhoo particularly when real things still wait to be done surely aggravates antipathy of Russia and bring about or increase suspicion. Therefore it is extremely important to realize fully that the huge infrastructure systems China aspires to construct on the sovereign lands of countries in Central Asia and even Russia itself, by their essential feature, have almost "natural" inherent sensitivities. Those countries of course hold related doubts and worries about their longer-term sovereignty, autonomy, distribution of prospective benefits and costs, and traditional “sphere of influence” interests on the part of Moscow. This sort of construction is "naturally" easy to bring out nationalistic worries, stimulate domestic political controversy and even faction struggle shrouded by nationalism, if China operates inappropriately. All these concern with a vitally important issue: China's related words, deeds, and manners should have effective soft power, or widespread and profound beneficial influence that, as a great ancient Chinese poet wrote, "moistens all things softly, without sound."
