Absence of common, mutually acceptable vision for the re-unified Korea¡¯s place in future security architecture in Northeast Asia remains a major reason for drastic lack of coordinated actions by US, China, Russia and Japan in resolving nuclear issue. Some politicians and experts in the US, the ROK and Japan believe that denuclearization of North Korea will bring about emergence the re-unified Korea as a member of the tripartite military-political alliance of U.S.A.-Japan-ROK. Such a vision is highly unlikely to be welcomed in Moscow and Beijing. There is no doubt that both capitals will perceive such a triangle as a deterrent against Russia and China. Attempts to use a future unified Korea as a de-facto a forward base of maritime powers - the United States and Japan - against continental - China and Russia can hamper and is already hindering both the solution of the nuclear problem and the establishment of a comprehensive and sustainable peace system in Northeast Asia. ¡°The Big Four¡± together with North and South Korea should launch a second track for relevant discussion of the issue.
Key words: Northeast Asia, Korean peninsula, great powers, nuclear problem, security system
1. Introduction
The conflict situation on the Korean Peninsula was caused by the split of Korea after the WWII and the ongoing confrontation between two Korean states for domination on the peninsula. Antagonism between the North and the South has created one of the most dangerous hotbeds of regional tension. The internationalization of the conflict during the Korean War contributed to the fact that the Korean Peninsula for over 70 years remains an arena of rivalry and, at times, confrontation of global players – the US, China, Russia and Japan.
Since the 1990s the nuclear problem has become an indispensable item on the agenda of almost all summits of the above mentioned four "big countries", meetings of their foreign ministers, as well as the UN, G8(since 2014- G7), G20, APEC and many other important international forums. The question arises: why, in spite of really huge efforts, the problem still remains far from being resolved. Vice versa, its final solution - complete denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula - seems more and more difficult and distant to achieve.
Many experts believe that the lack of cooperation of the four ¡°big powers¡± in the efforts to resolve the nuclear problem was and remain a major reason for this result. In this paper, the author offers his personal vision of the main factors that prevented such interaction and prospects for fostering it in the future.
2. The US Hidden Agenda for Korea
It is unlikely that anybody will deny the notion that the US played a major role in promoting the DPRK's nuclear program into the international political agenda in the early 1990s. Washington is still trying to claim the role of a representative of the entire international community in solving this problem and at the same time trying to impose on the world its vision of the causes of its emergence, and, most importantly, ways to solve it, with little regard to opinions and proposals of other participants in the settlement.
The history of the negotiation process on the nuclear problem at the "Six-Party" format (US, China, Russia, Japan, North and South Korea), held in 2003-2008, demonstrated that the United States used the talks not so much to deal with the non-proliferation dossier, but to realize its own geopolitical interests in the region, the essence of which was maintaining at any cost US military and political dominance in East Asia. Within this framework the US used all means available to achieve, one way or another, isolation and subsequent collapse of the DPRK. Sure, such a course could hardly win support from China and Russia.
With the advent of B.Obama¡¯s ¡°pivot to Asia¡±, US major efforts were shifted to "deter" China and make it to pursue a policy that fits into the framework of the US-led world order. Realizing a regime change in the DPRK and unifying the peninsula under Washington¡¯s patronage, thus obtaining the most important bridgehead at the junction of the borders of Russia and China, remains the US ultimate goal in the region.
The approach represents a real, not declamatory US policy toward North Korea. It was epitomized by Victor Cha, a well-known expert on Korean affairs in the Bush administration. As early as in 2009 he left a very explicit behest to Obama team of newcomers to White House: ¡°Keep an eye on the prize: Remember that the ultimate prize is not denuclearization but managing an eventual ¡°inheritance¡± process where a united Korea, free and democratic, is an engine of peace and economic growth in Asia and a global partner of the U.S. in world affairs¡±.[1]
With the coming to power of the Trump administration certain adjustments were made to this policy. They were caused first of all by the unexpected success of the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs, namely by the North¡¯s acquisition of means of delivery of nuclear weapons to the continental part of the US. Any attempts to eliminate this capability by military means, firstly, did not guarantee success and were fraught with unpredictable consequences, and, secondly, met with strong objections from US two main allies in the region – South Korea and Japan, which could suffer most in the event of a new war in the region.
As a result, the United States was forced once again to try a negotiated solution to the problem. However, the 2018-2019 dialogue, like it had happened before, was designed not so much to bring about the complete denuclearization of the DPRK (although this goal is not officially removed), as to draw the country to the US sphere of influence in accordance with US strategy of "containment" and "encirclement" of China.
Recently some American experts explore possibility of including the DPRK, along with the ROK in the US-led future security system embracing both North and South Korea in case Pyongyang accepts the American script of denuclearization. It would allow the US to establish its control over a unique in strategic value region of NEA which is located on a joint of borders of Russia and China. It is assumed that in this situation, the US will act as a guarantor of the security of the entire Korean peninsula - not only South, but also North Korea.[2]
Some US "think tanks" and scholars are proposing plans to radically strengthen the US position in Northeast Asia through the formation of a new system of peace maintenance there, which would allow the US to retain its military presence in the region. The calculation is that although the DPRK and the PRC have recently improved bilateral relations, Pyongyang nevertheless allegedly perceives China¡¯s rise as "potentially threatening to its own foreign policy autonomy and political independence."[3] Consequently, American experts conclude that North Korea may be more receptive to the idea of US-proposed alignment of forces in the region.
According to these calculations, among the tasks of the future "trilateral partnership in the field of security" will be: first, "preventing Chinese domination over the Korean Peninsula" to "allow North and South Korea to determine their own futures, either separately or together"; secondly, ¡°managing and defusing the broader Chinese strategic threat to the Asia-Pacific region¡±, and thirdly, to make Japan feel more comfortable in an environment of inter-Korean détente in order to prevent the resurgence of nationalism and militarism in that country.[4]
As it became quite clear, Trump¡¯s Korean policy ¡°grand design¡± includes applying ¡°maximum pressure¡± to the DPRK in order to isolate and weaken the country as much as possible, and then offer to Pyongyang "security guarantees", adding as a carrot prosperity "according to Trump¡¯s receipt". Perhaps in the hope of winning in this great geopolitical combination lies the secret of such an uncharacteristic for D.Trump complaisance, which he has been demonstrating for more than a year toward the DPRK, even after failure of the summit with Kim Jong-un in Hanoi.
However, the DPRK-China summits on the eve or after almost all talks between North Korean leader and the US and South Korea testified that Pyongyang, though not averse to play such games with Washington, is afraid of putting all eggs in a single basket. While praising Trump, the North Koreans hardly failed to notice the US recent actions concerning events in Venezuela. Pyongyang has enough ground to suspect that the latest technologies of changing the undesirable regime, tested in Venezuela, will be used not only in Latin America.
3. Searching for Unified Korea ¡°Place under the Sun¡±
Time and again encountered problems and difficulties in solving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula makes us to conclude that without solution of a certain fundamental problem, directly related to the region¡¯s future security architecture as a whole, we will continue incessantly stumble on minor problems and will not be capable to tackle them.
The fundamental issue which any future peace process in Northeast Asia, including denuclearization of Korea should address to is finding an acceptable for four ¡°big countries¡± – the US, China, Russia and Japan - place for the re-unified Korea in the future regional security system. Short of such an agreement each and every participant of any future settlement will remain very suspicious about other participants¡¯ plans and actions.
It is open secret that many politicians and experts in the US, the ROK and Japan believe that the re-unified Korea will become a member of the tripartite military-political alliance of US-Japan-ROK, to which Australia has been already linked by a set of agreements with the ROK and Japan. For such re-unified Korea had been already assigned a mission to play a role of a ¡°global partner of the US in world affairs¡±.[5]
But it is highly unlikely that such development to be welcomed in Moscow and Beijing. Both countries are likely to perceive such a triangle as a deterrent against Russia and China. Such an alliance would be tantamount to the emergence on Russia¡¯s Far Eastern borders an Asian clone of NATO. The more so that the new block will be protected by THAAD system which is actively deployed by the U.S.A. and their allies in the region.[6]
Attempts to use future re-unified Korea as de-facto a forward base of maritime powers - the United States and Japan - against continental - China and Russia can hamper and is already hindering the solution of the nuclear problem, establishment of a comprehensive and sustainable peace system in Northeast Asia, and the re-unification of Korea itself.
4. Conclusion
Russian President Vladimir Putin at his summit with Chairman Kim Jong-un on April 25, 2019 in Vladivostok expressed support for gradual process of trading nuclear disarmament for sanction relief and said that the DPRK needs security guarantees, possibly not only from the US, but other nations, too, before abandoning her nuclear arsenal.[7]
Speaking to the Journalists after the summit Russian President said that ¡°our interests coincide with those of the United States¡± on the issue of denuclearization,[8] Vladimir Putin informed Donald Trump of the key results of his meeting with Kim Jong-un, ¡°stressing that Pyongyang¡¯s good-faith fulfillment of its commitments should be accompanied by reciprocal steps to ease the sanctions pressure on North Korea¡±.[9]
Easing of sanctions and providing conditions for DPRK¡¯s participation in the implementation of energy, infrastructure and other multilateral economic projects in the region would be (along with multilateral security guarantees) another proof for her ruling elite that the international community took on the path of gradual integration of the DPRK into political, financial, trade networks of the modern world instead of trying to bring about a regime change in the country.
The on-going suspension of negotiating process on the nuclear problem provide South and North Korea with unique chance through their own combined efforts to size leadership in removing threat of another major conflict, promoting peace and common prosperity. The year of 2018 proved that the inter-Korean dialogue could become a major factor of stability on the Korean peninsula. The dialogue is vitally necessary to improve the current uneasy situation between North and South Korea. Both sides should resume working on implementation of the bilateral agreements and understandings reached at the various talks held during several previous decades, including those agreed upon at the three historical inter-Korean summits held in 2018. It is high time for the Koreans both in the North and in the South to take its nation¡¯s destiny in their own hands.
Russia hopes that the unified Korea will become her good neighbor and a major economic partner. Emergence of such an actor in the region is perceived as favorable for Russia since it would broaden her policy options in Northeast Asia.
Russia¡¯s Foreign Policy Concept, approved by President Vladimir Putin in 2016 states that ¡°Russia is interested in maintaining traditionally friendly relations with the Democratic People¡¯s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, and will seek to ease confrontation and de-escalate tension on the Korean Peninsula, as well as achieve reconciliation and facilitate intra-Korean cooperation by promoting political dialogue.¡±[10]
Generally, the events on the Peninsula in 2018-2019 showed the realism of the proposals put forward by Russia and China in a joint statement of Russia and China Foreign Ministries on July 4, 2017, although the main disputing parties - the United States and North Korea - prefer to not mention the initiative. Russia and China will have to convince the United States and some of its allies of the futility of their attempts to use non-proliferation agenda to advance their geopolitical plans in the region and seriously seek a negotiated solution to the Korean problems, taking into account the security interests of all regional powers.
References
[1] Cha, Victor. U.S.-Korea Relations: Obama¡¯s Korea Inheritence. Comparative Connections. Oct-Dec.2009. URL: http://cc.pacforum.org/2009/01/obamas-korea-inheritance/
[2] McKinney, William. Korea at a Crossroads: Time for a US-ROK-DPRK Strategic Realignment. 38NORTH. Sept. 17, 2018. URL:https://www.38north.org/2018/09/wmckinney091718
[3] Sokolsky R., Depetris D. Imagining a New US-South Korean Security Architecture. 38NORTH. November 15, 2018. URL: https://www.38north.org/2018/11/rsokolskyddepetris111518
[4] McKinney, William. Korea at a Crossroads: Time for a US-ROK-DPRK Strategic Realignment. 38NORTH. Sept. 17, 2018. URL:https://www.38north.org/2018/09/wmckinney091718
[5] Cha, Victor. U.S.-Korea Relations: Obama¡¯s Korea Inheritence. Comparative Connections. Oct-Dec.2009. URL: http://cc.pacforum.org/2009/01/obamas-korea-inheritance/
[6] Zhebin, Alexander. Ovecoming Obstacles for China-Japan Cooperation over the Korean Peninsula. In The Koreas between China and Japan. Ed. by Victor Teo and Lee Guen. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2014, p.142.
[7] News conference following Russian-North Korean talks. 25.04.2019. Vladivostok. Russky Island. URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60370
[8] News conference following Russian-North Korean talks. 25.04.2019. Vladivostok. Russky Island. URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60370