Gleb A.Ivashentsov
The inter-Korean normalization is the main impetus to the solution of the Korean peninsula nuclear problem
The tension around the Korean Peninsula is one of the main threats to international security today. Pyongyang initially developed its nuclear missile program not against its Southern neighbor, but to protect itself from a potential US strike in a possible new inter-Korean war. With the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the middle of 2010s, North Korea became the third country in the world, after Russia and China, to be able to strike the mainland of the United States.
Pyongyang's nuclear missile program is dangerous, however, not only for Washington. North Korea becoming a nuclear state undermines the entire current system of nuclear non-proliferation. For example, under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions and reintegrating into the world economy. But if the JCPOA, from which the US has already withdrawn, finally disintegrates, nothing, not even possible military strikes by the US or Israel, would stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power.
North Korea's nuclear missile program also has an impact on the positions of its neighbors in the region. Few people remember that it was Seoul not Pyongyang to be first to start military nuclear development on the Korean Peninsula in 1970s. And this program may well be restored. Can we also exclude that if the United States withdraws from a bilateral agreement with one of its allies in Asia on the so-called "nuclear umbrella", that state would start its own nuclear weapons program which would provoke a a kind of chain reaction with its neighbors? The likelihood of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations such as the so called Islamic State is also growing.
The second problem is that the line between defensive and offensive policy is very shaky. Now the DPRK does not plan to attack anyone, it needs nuclear weapons for protection. But is there any guarantee that in the future Pyongyang will not want to use force against Seoul, believing that nuclear missiles will protect it from the US interference on the side of the South?
The question is also how safe is the storage of North Korean nuclear weapons, whether a computer failure or other kind of incident can occur that could cause a potential armed conflict in which weapons of mass destruction can be used.
Today, the role of the main fighter against the North Korean nuclear program was assumed by the US President Trump. But "a complete, verifiable, and irreversible" nuclear disarmament, which the American side has been talking about, is an absolutely unrealistic and politically impossible. For Pyongyang, the nuclear missile program is a shield for its security, and it will not just give up this shield.
The US has tried to pressure North Korea with sanctions. But it turned out that sanctions do not work against Pyongyang. For several reasons, the first of which is China. Beijing, like Moscow and Washington, is dissatisfied with the erosion of the non-proliferation regime, and if it were to implement strict economic sanctions, it could actually strangle North Korea, because up to 90 percent of all North Korean trade now is trade with China.
But China's policy on the Korean Peninsula is influenced by additional factors, many of which are far more important from Beijing's point of view than the threat of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
China views the balance of power in Northeast Asia primarily through the prism of its confrontation with the United States. Washington's efforts to fill the US-Japan-South Korean military partnership with new content are perceived in Beijing as encircling China. In these circumstances, keeping the DPRK afloat has a strategic value for China. China does not need an internal political crisis in North Korea that would lead to civil unrest, refugee flows, and uncontrolled export of nuclear technology and components of other weapons of mass destruction. In addition, China does not see the DPRK's nuclear program as a direct threat to itself. North Korean nuclear weapons are perceived by Beijing primarily as a problem for the United States and its allies. This is why China, on the one hand, participates in technical sanctions in good faith and stops North Koreans ' attempts to gain access to materials and components for the nuclear missile program, and on the other hand, continues to trade with the DPRK, including bypassing sanctions.
The problem is too serious to approach it in a cowboy way, from the position of "all at once". But the American establishment and President Trump as the most ardent conductor of its interests, stand on this. And since" all at once " - that is, the immediate and complete missile and nuclear disarmament of the DPRK is impossible by definition, Trump uses the dialogue with Kim Jong Eun not so much to solve the problem, as to promote his own "public relations”, trying to convince the American voter that in countering North Korean nuclear preparations, he surpassed all his predecessors.
However, is Kim Jong Eun ready to make any agreements with Trump in the current situation, when the latter has neither the best relations with the US Congress, nor clear electoral prospects. It is in Kim's interest to delay any specific agreements in order to insure against a situation when Trump's successor renounces the obligations assumed by Trump, just as Trump himself is now withdrawing from the treaties concluded by his predecessors, such as the ABM and INF Treaties with Russia and the nuclear deal with Iran.
Pyongyang needs security guarantees, and it seems ready to discuss a multilateral system of such guarantees. It is no accident that Kim Jong Eun, after four summits with XI Jinping, three with Moon Jae - In, and two and a half with Trump (if you count the handshake in Panmunjom in 2019 summer), went to Vladivostok 2019 April for a summit with Vladimir Putin, and then started talking about a summit with Shindzo Abe. In fact, this may mean a return in one form or another to the Six-Parties format for discussing existing problems and developing a system of guarantees.
Positive progress in resolving the issue of the DPRK's nuclear missile program can only be achieved through a step-by-step approach that would first limit, then reduce, and ultimately eliminate the weapons under discussion. It is clear that since the nuclear status of the DPRK is included in the country's Constitution, for Pyongyang, the topic of abandoning the nuclear program at the moment looks non-negotiable. But what if we start with an agreement between the United States and North Korea, with the participation of other six countries on the closure of the nuclear weapons production center in Yong Ben in exchange for lifting of economic sanctions? Or divide the talks on North Korea's missile and nuclear programs? For example, Kim Jong Eun declares a moratorium on missile launches and nuclear tests, which, in fact, is already in effect, because since November 2017 there have been no tests, stops the development of ICBMs, freezes the production of nuclear materials, opens its nuclear facilities for international inspections and guarantees the non-proliferation of missile and nuclear technologies. In response, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo officially recognize the DPRK, establish diplomatic relations with it, exchange embassies, restrict military activities near its borders, reduce and eventually lift sanctions, and provide financial assistance.
In the current broad and detailed discussion of the North Korean nuclear crisis, "behind the scenes" remains the inter-Korean crisis, when one Korean nation is divided into two separate States for almost three quarters of a century. North Korea's nuclear missile program, as already noted, was adopted by Pyongyang to prevent a potential US strike in the event of an inter-Korean war. Eliminating the threat of such a war would also remove the threat of an American strike on the DPRK, to which Pyongyang justifies its nuclear missile development. Therefore, inter-Korean normalization can give a powerful impetus to solving the nuclear problem.
The main result of the inter-Korean and North Korean-American summits held over the past two years is that both Washington and Seoul have come to terms with the existence of the DPRK and have adopted a policy of peaceful coexistence with it. However, they are not yet talking about recognizing the status of the DPRK as a sovereign state as well as the legality and constitutionality of its leadership.
The situation is frankly unnatural when the military confrontation with the DPRK formally involves not the Republic of Korea, but the UN as a party to the Korean War. The 1953 Armistice agreement was signed by the forces that opposed the Korean People's Army and the Chinese people's volunteers on behalf of the so-called UN command in Korea, consisting of military contingents of 16 States headed by the United States, i.e., ultimately, on behalf of the UN.
But this agreement meant the cessation of just hostilities, not the state of war, and so the UN is still de jure at war with the DPRK, which is at least strange, since the DPRK has been a full member of the UN since 1991.
It is time to adopt a Declaration of the UN Security Council, which states that the Korean War was a page of the past, that the UN Security Council closes this page and, that accordingly, there is no need for the UN command in Korea. At the same time, the presence of American troops in South Korea should be regulated exclusively by interstate agreements between the Republic of Korea and the United States.
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In connection with the inter-Korean summits of 2018, the question of the need to replace the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty has repeatedly surfaced. At the same time, there is a significant difference of opinion as to which states should be parties to this Treaty.
We should probably proceed from the following. The 1953 Armistice agreement was not an interstate document. It was signed by the commanders of the armed forces that participated in the Korean War - the head of the government of the DPRK Kim Il Sung, the commander of the Chinese people's volunteers and the commander-in-chief of the UN troops, an American General. The representative of South Korea, following the instructions of the then President of the country, Lee Seung-Man, refused to sign the Agreement. Thus, neither the Republic of Korea nor the United States and China were involved in the Armistice agreement in their state capacity. Moreover, the United States and China, as states, did not participate in the Korean War. American troops fought as part of an international contingent sent to Korea by a decision of the UN Security Council, and Chinese troops fought as volunteers.
Given these circumstances, the peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula should be a treaty of two sovereign independent States-the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, possibly with the guarantees of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council viz. Russia, China, the United States, Britain and France.
The future of not only North-East Asia, but also the entire Asia-Pacific region, as well as the development of global processes, largely depends on how things go around the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula. This problem can only be solved on a collective basis by the efforts of all interested parties.
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