The cursed blessing with the COVID-19 Pandemic?

Regional security cooperation in the Korean Peninsula

Niklas Swanström 

Director 

Institute for Security and Development Policy (WWW.ISDP.EU)

Regional security cooperation, security here seen in the broader context but potentially as lethal as any other security threat, has been largely discredited in Northeast Asia, and any real potential for improving regional structures has been slim, at best. On several occasions, it has been clear that there are very few realistic opportunities for cooperation and even less integration in the regional security area. It would take a crisis of epic proportions to create incentives among the regional states, here also included the U.S., into something that could create a framework for regional security.

The situation with an escalating pandemic threat could potentially have opened up opportunities for regional security, the impact on the health situation has been devastating for many states, even if the real impact will have to be evaluated later. The escalation of threat perception has sunk the world economy into an economic decline of unimaginable proportions with increased unemployment, stock markets almost crashing, and international trade halting. The question is if this is enough to create a shared regional interest to build something that could evolve into regional cooperation?

What is the current situation in early spring 2020?

The COVID-19 epidemy, also known as the Corona, Wuhan, "China" virus, even if the last two are severely criticized from China and mainly used by President Trump, is emphasizing the lack of security cooperation in Northeast Asia rather than the opposite. On the 27th of March, when this article was written, North Korea (DPRK, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) was still not officially affected by the Coronavirus, even if unofficially, there have been indications that there are several cases already detected in Pyongyang and along the border to China. Additionally, in the backwater of the Corona crisis, DPRK has stepped up its ballistic missile testing, albeit primarily short-range so far. Neither step has been conducive to regional cooperation or dialogue.

There seems that it could be a quick spread of the COVID virus in North Korea, a country with weak health institutions and a population weakened by malnutrition and food insecurity. To make matters worse, the epidemy is threatening the weakest groups in North Korea, i.e., people that been relying on smuggling between North Korea and China, small traders, and the smallest of traders that have been surviving on the margins of the internal opening up of the market and the already impoverished poor in North Korea. This reduction of movement and reduction of internal freedom seems to have caused a more significant impact among women than men, and the small business that has been closed down are often run by women that will lose any possibility for additional funding.

North Korea closed its borders very quickly, and to date, trying to send out international staff from embassies and international organizations out of the country, maybe to reduce the health risk for these people or to minimize the influence of the international community over the situation. The result is nevertheless that North Korea has increasingly isolated itself, being for health or political reasons, and that the situation in North Korea risks being unsustainable if it is aiming to increase regional stability. The actual impact of the COVID-19 virus is hard to estimate in any state, possibly except for South Korea, that has been testing large segments of its population, and has seen a positive development. However, in North Korea, with its lack of transparency and medical capacity, the spread will not only be impossible to contain but also to estimate accurately, and therefore a large number of casualties could rapidly emerge. Officially, there are few, if any, cases of the virus.

Concerns are growing that the COVID virus could be "weaponized" in the sense that arguments both to close the borders to North Korea and deny humanitarian assistance or for that matter going the Chinese way of exporting assistance in exchange of an expected diplomatic and political gain, a strategy that Beijing is implementing in, for example, within Europe. On the other side, United States State Department has been eager to utilize the situation to assist and build a rapprochement with North Korea, even if this offer has been up to date denied by North Korea, and it is likely to remain so unless the U.S. compromises on other issues as well.[1] China has likewise attempted to use this situation to assist North Korea with the pandemic.

Assistance from international organizations has reached North Korea, but it is unclear how much has reached the effected groups and how widely distributed the assistance has been to broader groups in North Korea. It has been apparent that the mistrust is staggering between North Korea and the states that have offered assistance, despite the "love" that President Trump and Chairman Kim in South Korea (ROK Republic of Korea) has for each other and the eagerness President Moon has to reengage with North Korea. There are many obstacles to overcome if North Korea will be willing to accept international assistance, and chiefly the U.S., to combat this pandemic. Even if this is true, this might be the single most crucial possibility for North Korea to engage with the outside world and create effective mechanisms for security cooperation and information exchanges, something that could spill over into other security areas over time. The argument is that possible aid should only be humanitarian, and it should not be broadly impacting the sanctions, if at all. However, any aid, humanitarian or otherwise, will have to create channels of communication and hopefully a regional dialogue on the impact of the COVID virus in North Korea and the potential impact from China, South Korea, or Russia on North Korea or vice versa. However, there does not seem to be enough of a security challenge in Northeast Asia to overcome the tension and distrust among the parties.

Why is COVID-19 important for the Korean Peninsula?

Before getting into a discussion on what is possible, it is essential to look into why it is essential to focus on COVID-19 and the possible impact the pandemic will have on regional security. Undoubtedly, there has emerged growing selfishness around the world today in the footprints of COVID-19, where every state looks at its security first, even within the EU, so why should we even care what happens in North Korea?

Firstly, there is the humanitarian aspect of the pandemic, even if it is at this moment in time unclear how North Korea has been affected by COVID-19. The impact has been of pandemic proportions, and the mortality rate has been higher than regular flu, but more importantly, the casualties have been very high among groups that have had underlying medical disorders. Currently, in North Korea years of starvation, mass campaigns and limited medical capacity has most likely created a population that is more likely to respond poorly on the pandemic than China or Europe. Moreover, there seems to be a lack of capacity to deal with large epidemics at large in North Korea as its health institutions are notoriously weak, even if there have been arguments that they are better than comparable states, as well as disproportionally focused on Pyongyang and its elite. It has been evident from communication with North Koreans as well as international staff in the embassies as well as international organizations that any more massive outbreak of COVID-19 could be devastating for the North Korean population.  Moreover, China and the rest of the world are also at risk as the Sino-North Korean border is exceptionally porous, and unregulated trade is rampant, even if the illegal trade has decreased during the Corona outbreak.

The North Korean population at large is very likely to be affected by the COVID virus due to the current situation of malnutrition and starvation, an estimated 60 percent of the population is perceived to be living in absolute poverty.[2] Women and especially women in the border areas are arguably more likely to be more affected as they are heavily involved in the illegal border trade that has shut down with potentially devastating impacts on these groups. The unfortunate result is that women, maybe the most vulnerable group, as they to a great extent had lost their work due to increased social control and sanctions to contain the spread of the epidemic has most likely been exposed to a potential infection early on as they regularly crossed the border before it was shut down by DPRK. They are also in an exposed position as they are engaged in illicit activities, albeit often accepted by local officials, and could be excluded from even the minuscule health care that is available to other groups and if the government would seek out scapegoats these groups are favorable targets as they are politically weak and marginalized.

Secondly, North Korea could likely be the origin of the second wave of COVID-19 if not adequately regulated early on, and the risk would be exceptionally high in the Chinese border region, but generally, it could trigger a second wave throughout the region and globally. It is not the most humanitarian reason to engage North Korea. However, in the self-interest of China and the world at large, no state must be left outside any form of health cooperation that deals with pandemics, especially not states with a lack of transparency and a reputation for problematic reporting to the authorities. The same problem is very much the reality for any state or disputed state that is excluded from the WHO or forced into isolation without access to international cooperation and assistance; other examples are Taiwan and areas in conflict all around the world. An isolated North Korea could very well create a haven for a long-term virus spread if not engaged in a regional or preferably global network of dealing with pandemics like this more effectively.

The COVID virus could also impact the political situation in DPRK, we have also seen several people leaving their assignments for lack of success in handling the situation, and even if the regime is secure, it could minimize its maneuver space. It is likely that the situation will be blamed on external actors and limit the opportunities for continued dialogue and openness but also force the regime in Pyongyang to take a more heavy-handed approach to the international community and internal failure to contain the spread of the COVID virus. Such a situation would result in a more conflictual situation with increased tension and possibly increased sanctions and isolation of North Korea. That is not to say that the COVID virus will be able to create a situation where Chairman Kim will become removed, something which has proven to be historically inaccurate and will continue to be so, but the maneuver space for engagement and compromises will decrease.

Finally, the situation is, however, not all gloomy, the crisis could also be seen as an opportunity to extend collaboration and dialogue regarding pandemics and specifically COVID-19. The situation is increasingly difficult for both North Korea and other states such as China but also the U.S. and South Korea. The chaotic situation with a pandemic spread of COVID-19 could be a perfect opportunity to build partnerships and cooperation around. The challenges are that President Trump has largely failed to build an effective defense in the U.S. and has failed to take international leadership over the situation, up to date.[3]  China has not able to take the lead on this issue as North Korea views the U.S. role as essential, but we have also been unable to come around the refusal of the U.S. to demand some action on denuclearization even if only symbolic before compromises can materialize. The reality is that all bilateral relationships, including DPRK and ROK, has been deadlocked since the failure in Hanoi.

Regional structures in the cards or not?

Pandemics that threatens the very economic stability of the world, additional of being detrimental to economic development, could at a massive scale open some doors for increased regional engagement. Everything would not change over one night even if we took action, and realistically a regional security structure is far away. However, the perception is that COVID-19 is threatening the very essence of state stability and has raised insecurity in Northeast Asia significantly. That said, regionalism in Northeast Asia is extremely weak, and despite some regional economic structures, few genuinely regional structures could work in situations of security challenges, ranging from pandemics to military security. Multilateral cooperation is not a preferred option to deal with security challenges in the region. However, at the same time, it will be increasingly challenging to manage regional security due to the pan-national and arguably even global character of many of the new security challenges, such as environmental, pandemics, non-proliferation, to mention a few, that all calls for regional and global structures. The author has, in other papers, argued for the need for multilateral structures in combination with bilateral initiatives at both the official as well as unofficial level.[4] 

The basic argument is that bilateralism is erratic and difficult to build long-term security cooperation that manages to consider a multitude of states. Multilateral cooperation creates a broader understanding and removes spoilers and creates more effective platforms of engagement, but that lack of trust and sovereignty issues makes it very difficult to move from bilateralism to multilateralism. Therefore, informal networks play a crucial role in creating long-term multilateral frameworks. However, in the case of pandemics, there is a need to have direct formal structures, structures that we can find on the global level, but these structures have a minimal spill-over impact on regional stability and engagement on the Korean Peninsula.

Is the current pandemic at a scale that it could force the governments in the region to cooperate and seek some de-escalation of the conflict? The failure has always been that there are no security challenges that have been perceived to be threatening to all actors at the same point in time. Denuclearization is, as one example, not possible due to that one actor perceives them to increase security, and others argue, at least in part, that they should dismantle their nuclear weapons before anything could be accomplished. The pandemic concern of the COVID virus could, therefore, in all its bleakness, be a concern that all parties share, and if the situation is not put under control, there is a broader regional and international threat. As far as we know, the situation has been effectively managed in China, and there are reasons for optimism, and this is not conducive for engagement as it decreases the common risk perception. If the situation emerges that it is only a threat to North Korea or at a scale that it would not risk national security, it would not be feasible for the North Korean government to seek engagement as the costs would likely increase for the regime.

The lack of established structure is partly to blame, and if there had been a mechanism in place, there could have been an opportunity to engage when the situation has been perceived as nearly catastrophic, and it would not have taken much political courage to engage. Multilateralism is unfortunately not always the remedy, EU solidarity fell apart when the COVID virus spread in Europe, and it not unlikely that a similar situation would have emerged in Northeast Asia as well. The reality is that states are primarily concerned with their survival and security, and little effort is paid on multilateral structures unless it benefits the relative security of an individual state. Even if multilateral structures are problematic, unilateral or bilateral engagements have also proven to be most problematic, and without multilateral solutions, situations such as pandemics, cybersecurity, or environmental threats cannot be adequately managed.

The Korean Peninsula has ended up between a rock and a hard place, decreased security in the aftermath COVID-19 is a reality. However, the distrust, historical animosity, and intense focus on sovereignty in the region prevent active regional structures that could increase regional and national security. Additional to the Korean Peninsula that exemplifies the challenges with excluding (voluntary or pressed) one actor from the regional and international engagement. Taiwan is another case where the political situation determines the security of millions of people, as the Mainland refuses to let Taiwan act independently in international organizations. Regardless of political concerns, there has to be a regional structure that could deal with the broader security challenges without getting engulfed in ideologies, or political status as the threats are increasingly deadly, and excluding one or several actors would potentially cause threats against their political system.

The inter-Korean normalization is the main impetus to the solution of the Korean peninsula nuclear problem
THE POST-SOVIET KOREAN DIASPORAS