Toward a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula: Inter-Korean Relations, the East Asian Community, and Global Politics  

Charles Armstrong 

Columbia University

Introduction

At the April 2018 Inter-Korean Summit between President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong Un in Panmunjom, the two sides declared that “South and North Korea agreed to actively pursue trilateral meetings involving the two Koreas and the United States, or quadrilateral meetings involving the two Koreas, the United States and China with a view to declaring an end to the war and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime.”[1] The term “peace regime,” or similar expressions, has been used in connection to the Korean peninsula for several decades now.  The term suggests a mechanism of maintaining peace between the two sides on the Korean peninsula as well as among other parties to the Korean conflict, based on an agreement that would replace the Korean War Armistice. The concept of a permanent peace regime has become increasingly prevalent since the early 1990s, and appeared in the language of both the inter-Korean summit in April 2018 and the US-DPRK summit in June 2018. Despite the apparent lack of momentum in inter-Korean and US-DPRK relations over the past year, all three parties have agreed to move toward such a peace regime. Yet the term has never been clearly defined. What is a “peace regime” for Korea? Who would be the participants in such a regime? How would it be maintained and enforced? Presumably a Korean peace regime would involve an agreement that the Korean War has ended and a declaration that all parties to the war are now at peace with one another. Logically this agreement must include the two Koreas and the United States, and most likely China as well. It would address the security concerns of all parties, including nuclear weapons and foreign troops. Finally, a peace regime would include normal diplomatic and economic relations among all parties on and around the Korean Peninsula. Just as the unresolved Korean War has been at the center of regional tension for nearly seventy years, so a clear and unambiguous Korean peace would be at the center of a more peaceful set of relations in the Northeast Asian region.

             Concretely, a permanent peace regime would establish a definitive end to the Korean War, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and the removal of barriers to normal political and economic relations in and around the Korean peninsula. In such a regime, a peaceful Korean peninsula would be at the core of a more peaceful East Asian community, itself embedded in the normal process of global politics. Such a regime would involve more than a change in inter-Korean relations alone: a permanent peace regime would bring an end to the Korean conflict, a critical problem of global political concern since the Korean War broke out in 1950. It would mean a fundamental transformation of Korea’s relations to global politics.

From War Regime to Peace Regime

The American political scientist Stephen D. Krasner defines international regimes as sets of  “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.”[2]  Krasner’s highly influential theory of regimes has focused generally on informal norms and procedures, although law and diplomacy are aspects of international regimes as well. A putative Korean peace regime would entail a more formal agreement but would also involve consensual principles, norms of behavior, and rules less codified than laws. The inverse of a Korean peace regime already exists: we may refer to it as a “war regime.” Although the Korean War was never formally ended, there have been no open hostilities since the Armistice Agreement of July 1953. This situation of conflict without hostilities, or frozen war, is itself a kind of regime: a more or less stable set of expectations and behaviors adhered to by affiliated parties (including the two Koreas, the US, China, and the United Nations) that has maintained a state of armed confrontation short of open conflict on the Korean peninsula. A Korean peace regime would replace the current war regime with a new set of “principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures” (as well as enforcement mechanisms) that would move the Korean peninsula away from confrontation and conflict and toward a condition of stable, cooperative, long-term peace. In other words, the goal of all parties concerned with peace on the Korean peninsula is to move from a war regime to a peace regime.

             Over the seventy years of Korean division, the parties involved in the conflict on the Korean peninsula have moved through a series of cycles of peace and war. Each of these cycles was precipitated by a crisis, conditioned by a specific historical context, leading through a negotiation process to an outcome that, so far, has fallen short of stable peace. We are now in what appears to be an early stage of such a cycle. It may be that the current conflict/peace cycle will break the pattern and lead to a permanent peace, as the participants in last year’s summit meetings claimed; or it may be that we will return to the familiar pattern of conflict and the reassertion of the long-established war regime. The remainder of this paper will outline the cycles of conflict and peace on the Korean peninsula from the creation of the Korean war regime in the late 1940s and early 1950s, through four peace cycles, including the present one. Although none of these cycles has yet led to a definitive breakthrough to stable peace, the idea of a “permanent peace regime” has steadily gained ground over the past several decades. The paper concludes with some reflections on the applicability of Kant’s “perpetual peace” to the idea of a Korean “permanent peace,” and probable scenarios for peace and conflict on the Korean peninsula going forward.

Consolidation of the War Regime, 1948 - 1953

As indicated above, the past seventy-one years of Korean division has witnessed a series of five conflict-peace cycles. Each cycle lasted approximately five years; each was precipitated by a crisis, within a unique political context, leading through a conflict-peace process, and produced a significant outcome, usually in the form of a joint document. In each cycle, the parties attempted but failed to attain an end to division and the peninsula reverted to a state of armed truce. The first cycle, the establishment of the Korean war regime, was characterized by the following:

• Crisis: the division of Korea, establishment of two mutually hostile regimes, and the outbreak of war on June 25, 1950

• Context: decolonization of Korea, political conflict on the peninsula, civil war in China, emerging Cold War between US and USSR

• Process: war between US-led UN forces and South Korea vs. North Korea and China

• Outcome: “temporary” cease-fire, July 27, 1953; collapse of peace talks in Geneva, April 1954; armed truce ever since

   

  The Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 was intended to impose a temporary halt to hostilities pending a political solution to Korean division and a formal end to the war.  Article IV of the agreement states

   

  In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.[3]

   

  Ultimately such an agreement was never reached. The “political conference” stipulated in the Armistice belatedly took place in Geneva from April 26 to June 15, 1954, involving all 15 belligerents in the Korean War as well as the Soviet Union. But the Geneva Conference failed to reach a settlement, and Korea reverted to the Armistice – or the war regime – which has characterized the peninsula to this day. As is often pointed out, Korean remains in a state of war under international law.[4] 

   

  First Peace Cycle, 1969 - 1974

   

  After the collapse of the Geneva Conference, the first serious attempt to break through the impasse of inter-Korean relations occurred in the early 1970s. This was precipitated, as the subsequent peace cycles would be, by recently escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula leading to a dangerous crisis. The outcome would be the first North-South joint statement on unification, the “July 4 Communiqué”of 1972.

   

• Crisis: heightened North-South conflict, fears of “abandonment” by China and US respectively

• Context: changes in Cold War order – US-Soviet détente, Sino-American rapprochement; US difficulties in Vietnam, “Nixon Doctrine” of disengagement

• Process: secret North-South talks, US-China discussion of Korea Question, including “alternative armistice arrangements.”

• Outcome: July 4 unification statement, direct North-South dialogue, observer status in UN for Koreas, followed by return

   

  The July 4 Communiqué was a relatively simple four-part agreement, beginning with a statement of three principles:

   

  First, unification shall be achieved independently, without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference. Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, without resorting to the use of force against each other. Third, a great national unity as one people shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.[5]

   

  The Communiqué was followed by a series of high-level meetings among officials from the North and the South, lasting just over a year. By August 1973, however, talks had broken down and the sides returned to mutual acrimony and estrangement. While the inter-Korean agreement of July 1972 was a major breakthrough, the two sides failed to escape from the war regime and transform it into a stable peace.

   

  Second Peace Cycle, 1989 – 1994

   

  The second Korean peace cycle coincided with an even more momentous set of changes than the first: the end of the Cold War that had given rise to Korean division in the first place.

   

• Crisis: end of Cold War, beginning of economic crisis in North Korea

• Context: global rise of South Korea (Seoul Olympics), recognition of Seoul by Moscow and Beijing, collapse of USSR and emergence of post-Cold War order

• Process: new North-South dialogue, supported by US.

• Outcomes: Basic Agreement of December 1991; Declaration on Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula of January 1992; 

   

  The inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the Declaration on Denuclearization were the most detailed inter-Korean joint statements to date, and were also supported by the United States. The Basic Agreement began as follows:

   

  Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation, December 1991

   

  CHAPTER 1SOUTH-NORTH RECONCILIATION

  Article 1 South and North Korea shall recognize and respect the system of each other.

  Article 2 South and North Korea shall not interfere in the internal affairs of each other.

  Article 3 South and North Korea shall not slander or defame each other.

  Article 4 South and North Korea shall refrain from any acts of sabotage or insurrection against each other.

  Article 5 South and North Korea shall together endeavour to transform the present state of armistice into a firm state of peace between the two sides and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement until such a state of peace is realized.

  Article 6 South and North Korea shall cease to compete with or confront each other, and instead shall cooperate and endeavour to promote the racial dignity and interests of Korea in the international arena.

  Article 7 South and North Korea shall establish and operate a South-North Liaison Office at Panmunjom within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement to ensure close liaison and consultations between the two sides.

  Article 8 South and North Korea shall establish a South-North Political Committee within the framework of the South-North High-Level Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement to consider concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the agreement on South-North reconciliation.[6]

   

  The Basic Agreement for the first time referred to “a firm state of peace,” the forerunner of the phrase “permanent peace regime,” as will be discussed below. Unfortunately, both the Basic Agreement and the Declaration of Denuclearization were soon sidelined by the nuclear crisis of 1993 – 94, when the US and DPRK came to the brink of military conflict over allegations that North Korea was secretly producing nuclear weapons. The nuclear crisis in turn lead to the historic US-DPRK Agreement Framework of October 1994, which froze North Korea’s plutonium program in exchange for international energy assistance. But the Agreed Framework  did not lead to US-DPRK normalization as it had been intended, nor were the hopes for North-South integration and de-nuclearization realized. Once again, a peace regime had failed to overcome the Korean war regime.

   

  Third Peace Cycle, 2003 – 2008

   

  The third Korean peace cycle emerged out of the ruins of the second, when the George W. Bush administration accused the DPRK of violating the 1994 Agreed Framework and declared the Agreement void. The crisis thus precipitated led to a new set of talks, this time a multilateral one among the six parties directly connected to the Korean Question (North and South Korea, the US, China, Russia and Japan) and to a new set of agreements that could have been (and one day may be) the foundation of a Northeast Asian peace regime.

   

• Crisis: Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis, October 2002 – April 2003

• Context: shift in US from Clinton to Bush, accusations of North Korean cheating on October 1994 Framework Agreement, “Axis of Evil” (N. Korea, Iraq, Iran) among “rogue states” and “terrorist allies”

• Process: Meetings among US, NK, SK, China, Russia and Japan in Beijing (Six-Party Talks)

• Outcomes: Two major agreement, partial dismantlement of Yongbyon nuclear facilities, but beginning of North Korean nuclear tests (2006) and suspension of talks after 2008

   

  The most significant agreement to come out of the Six-Party Talks was the Joint Statement of September 2005, which among other notable features contained for the first time the phrase “permanent peace regime:”

   

  Six-Party Talks, September 2005 Joint Statement

   

  1. The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner…The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.

  2. The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect e

  ach other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies…The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

   ….

  4. The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia. 5. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action".[7]

   

  Despite a second major joint statement in February 2007, the Six-Party Talks soon stalled over multiple issues, not least being North Korea’s testing of a nuclear device in 2006. The talks were finally suspended in 2009. Inter-Korean relations took a decided turn for the worse under the South Korean presidencies of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye (2008 – 2017), and North Korea’s nuclear testing accelerated under the leadership of Kim Jong Un, who took power following is father Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011.

   

  Fourth (Current) Peace Cycle, 2018 – 2023?

   

  Finally, the current peace cycle grew out of US-DPRK tensions following the assumption of Donald Trump as US president in 2017, North Korea’s long-range missile tests through 2018, and the strong pro-engagement policies of South Korean president Moon Jae-in, elected in May 2018.

   

• Crisis: accelerated North Korean nuclear testing under Kim Jong Un (2012 - ), increased UN sanctions, heightened rhetorical conflict between US and NK (“fire and fury”), successful ICBM test November 2017

• Context: new Trump presidency, pro-engagement South Korean administration, shift in North Korean priorities to economic development, Pyeongchang Olympics

• Process: renewed N-S dialogue, US-DPRK dialogue, summit and other high-level meetings

• Outcomes: N-S and US-DPRK joint statements, movement toward North-South economic cooperation, partial reduction of war regime (demining DMZ, suspension of US-ROK military exercises, N-S military communication), but failure of second US-DPRK summit in Hanoi.

• Future prospects: Third US-DPRK summit? Renewed N-S engagement? Peace declaration, normalization and a “permanent peace regime”? Denuclearization accompanied by sanctions relief are the crucial next steps, but the failure of the Hanoi Summit does not bode well.

  
   The participation of North Korean athletes and officials at the Pyeongchang Olympics in February 2018 was the most important breakthrough in inter-Korean relations in a decade, and later that year the leaders of North and South Korea held three summit meetings in six months, an unprecedented achievement. But the most historic event in the current peace cycle has been the first-ever summit meeting between the leaders of the US and the DPRK in Singapore in June 2018, followed by a second summit meeting in Hanoi in February 2019. The US-DPRK Singapore Declaration, rather like the North-South Joint Communique of 1972, was a fairly simple document:

   

               Singapore Declaration, June 2018

• The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.

• The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

• Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

• The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.[8]

   

  So far, however, only the last point has been followed through to any degree; Korean denuclearization is far from accomplished, or even significantly begun, and the US and DPRK have failed so far to transform their relationship – much less cooperate to “build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” The second Trump-Kim summit ended without any joint statement whatsoever, and progress in US-DPRK relations remains stalled.

   

  Prospects for Perpetual Peace

   

  The Korean war regime has proven to be remarkably tenacious. Despite unprecedented high-level interaction among South Korea, North Korea, and the US, the current peace cycle has so far failed to break through to a permanent peace.  Indeed, it is possible that the Korean peninsula could spiral into an even more dangerous cycle of conflict: if North-South and US-DPRK dialogue break down, North Korea could return to nuclear and missile tests, invoking increasingly punitive sanctions from the US and the United Nations, leading to economic crisis in the DPRK as well as deepening military confrontation and even open hostilities. On the other hand, if dialogue resumes and expands, the parties to the Korean Question could finally transform the war regime to a peace regime. In this scenario, dialogue would lead to a step-by-step process of denuclearization, accompanied by the gradual lifting of international sanctions on the DPRK. These steps would be accompanied in turn by a peace declaration between the US and DPRK and a treaty to end the Korean War among Washington, Beijing, Seoul and Pyongyang – perhaps expanded to a peace agreement with Russia and Japan, under the guarantee of the UN Security Council.[9] Connected to and under the auspices of such a regional peace regime, the two Koreas would ease their mutual hostility at last, and gradually move toward integration and ultimately unification. The Korean Question, one of the most intractable and dangerous problems of world politics since 1948, would finally be solved.

   

               There is as yet no consensus on what a Korean peace regime would entail or how it would be constructed. But such a regime would necessarily be more than a “negative peace,” or absence of violent conflict, but rather a “positive peace” that would establish and maintain the mechanisms for peaceful communication and interaction.[10] The current state of inter-Korean relations is hardly a negative peace at all, but rather a state of conflict just short of open hostilities, a war regime rather than a peace regime.  More than 200 years ago, Immanuel Kant envisioned a state of perpetual peace among nations, a global peace regime based on a positive idea of peace. In order to achieve this, Kant remarked, communities had to first overcome the natural state of war:

   

  The state of peace among men living side by side is not the natural state (status naturalis); the natural state is one of war. This does not always mean open hostilities, but at least an unceasing threat of war. A state of peace, therefore, must be established, for in order to be secured against hostility it is not sufficient that hostilities simply be not committed; and, unless this security is pledged to each by his neighbor (a thing that can occur only in a civil state), each may treat his neighbor, from whom he demands this security, as an enemy.[11]

   

  The condition of Korea since 1953 has been one in which hostilities have not been committed, for the most part, but is not a state of peace according to Kant’s definition. Peace, to even begin, must first be declared.

     

THE GLOBAL KOREAN COMMONWEALTH OR A PARAPHRASE OF THE UTOPIC PERSPECTIVE - Prof. Dr. German Kim, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University
Peace on the Korean Peninsula