Niklas Swanstrom
Institute for Security and Development Policy
Nswanstrom@isdp.eu
Www.isdp.eu
The challenges for multilateral peace in the Korean Peninsula.
Northeast Asia is characterized by two divergent forces: on the one hand there is relatively positive economic cooperation and interdependence, while on the other there is increased militarization and geopolitical competition. The latter of these is taking place despite the very positive recent developments between Seoul and Pyongyang as well as between Washington and Pyongyang. Although the Second Summit between Chairman Kim and President Trump in Hanoi appears to have culminated in a stand-off, a new precedent in US-DPRK, as well as DPRK-ROK, relations has been set. This does, however, not guarantee any lasting stability as relations are “stuck” in a bilateral structure that risks stalemating between uncompromising demands.
Northeast Asia remains the only region that has no formal security organization, which is problematic in light of the conventional arms race and historical enmities, as well as the de facto nuclear weapons status of North Korea and its long-term implications for the region. So far growing economic cooperation among the states of the region has not translated into cooperative behavior in the security field. Consequently, there is a growing need for multilateral and inclusive structures that could create a platform for peace, security, and integration at the regional level. At the very least this could help to secure and “lock in” progress on the Korean Peninsula and bridge challenges in bilateral relations, but could also simultaneously provide security guarantees for North Korea and regional states who feel threatened by its nuclear program.
There is an argument to be made that improvements in bilateral relations could guarantee regional security, but the situation on Korean Peninsula demonstrates that while improvements in bilateral relations provide a good point of departure, over the long term such arrangements are hard pressed to sustain and diversify the security dividend. Divergent interests, changes in political goals and administrations, as well as rising tensions between China and the U.S. will destabilize bilateral exchanges, making regional structures more necessary for maintaining long-term stability. The Second Summit in Hanoi is a good example of this where intentions are good but where the positions of parties are too far away from each other.
This is not to say that there are no regional structures in Northeast Asia or that there is no regional dialogue in the security domain. However, much of the dialogue is focused on economic issues, involves trans-regional organizations, and has proven largely ineffective in addressing the pressing challenge of security-building specific to the Northeast Asian context outside of bilateral talks. At the same time regional tensions have proliferated: a de facto nuclear armed North Korea that is unlikely to fully denuclearize any time soon, raising the likelihood of an atomic arms race and diminishing the credibility of the U.S. as a security guarantor has coincided with strained relations between Japan and South Korea, as well as between China and most of the region, and perhaps most prominently between China and the U.S. over economic and political disputes.
The situation is accentuated, and contributing to, eroding confidence in the U.S. and its security architecture, not only in Asia but also in Europe. In Northeast Asia, U.S. allies can respond to this situation by either accommodating Chinese priorities, which seems unlikely, or create effective regional structures that would decrease the dependency on an increasingly erratic U.S. The latter might even mean going nuclear themselves in the long run. This need for a new balance will remain and transform the geopolitical landscape even after a change in the White House, as the damage to diplomatic trust has already been done, even if the trust could be partially restored through initiatives such as the Asia Reassurance Initiative.
Denuclearization or stable nuclear relations?
In this outline, the point of departure is the current peace overtures and stalled denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula, its implications, and the need for multilateral negotiations and structures. However, the need for regional structures is not just limited to the Korean Peninsula – in fact, a variety of issues in the region require management, including Sino-U.S. tensions, the Cross-Straits dilemma and ongoing hostility between the ROK and Japan, to mention but a few. Although a number of bilateral meetings are taking place, such as the inter-Korean summits, the U.S.-DPRK summit, and Chinese-DPRK summits, a multilateral framework is not being favored on the Korean Peninsula and there remains an aversion to reinstituting the six-party framework and other multilateral structures to discuss the future of regional security cooperation.
There is a perception that multilateralism could hurt the relative gains made by each actor. North Korea fears that a multilateral framework will be arrayed against the interests of the DPRK and will not be able to have a neutral view, while the U.S. and Japan fears that a multilateral framework would weaken the sanctions and create a space of peroration for North Korea. Moreover, each of the states (or state-like entities in the case of Taiwan) that could potentially participate in such a framework are determined to structure a system that suits their individual needs and maximizes their benefit. It would be essential to establish a framework neutral to regional priorities; but this might also be the real stumbling block in creating a truly Northeast Asian mechanism. We could explore all wonderful, on paper, designs for multilateralism but no one of these would be stronger than the willingness of the participants to compromise and surrender at least a minimum on national sovereignty. This is a willingness that is very low at the moment, but this does not reduce the necessity as bilateral structures are also facing a stalemate.
One of the potential solutions could be to expand the security structure to include Southeast Asia. In particular, ASEAN could be useful given the region’s track record of inclusive and non-confrontational engagement. Furthermore, if ASEAN or a group of its member states were to take the lead in restructuring the East Asian security balance, it is would likely be perceived as being less threatening than if countries like China, the U.S., or Japan would take the lead. Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, etc. have all shown interest in being useful in the Korean Peninsula and the there is no lack of experience in creating softer security cooperation, something that could be more useful than a hard security mechanism in the short to medium term.
An additional complicating factor that adds a challenge is that North Korea has limited intentions to denuclearize under the current political and economic situation, and it would be premature to assume that its complete denuclearization could be a short-term goal. A first step for the parties involved in designing a new security balance is bilaterally managing economic sanctions and initiating a normalization process, this is both with the U.S. that could lead to security guarantees that are satisfactory for the North Korean regime but also a parallel process with South Korea. This is, needless to say, an extremely difficult situation to manage and it is unlikely that Pyongyang will accept an end to its nuclear power in the short or medium term. This is accentuated by the reality, acknowledged above, that the parties have no intention to engage in multilateral frameworks due to geopolitical tensions and the political benefits that can be gained through bilateral engagements. This is further complicated by the fact that all regional players, save North Korea, have their own proposals for regional security structures, each of which is designed with ambitions to dominate, or at least not be dominated, by other actors.
The bilateral talks between the U.S. and DPRK are essential for dealing with the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. However, it is not simply a question of unilateral denuclearization on the part of North Korean or that a denuclearization process could be arranged bilaterally. Pyongyang is unlikely to denuclearize unless some, if not all, of its demands on security and easing of sanctions are met, even if the precise scope of these remains unspecified. The U.S has been increasingly eager to find a solution beyond unilateral denuclearization and its special representative for North Korea, Stephen Biegun, at a conference in Stanford before the Hanoi meeting even indicated a willingness to treat denuclearization as the end of a process, even if the US has since backtracked and argued at the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference that the U.S. will “not do incremental denuclearization”. It is still unclear if this incremental denuclearization would an option for the North Korean regime, without extensive security guarantees, that will in practice be impossible to accept but anything more demanding on the DPRK seems to be out of the equation at this point in time. The reality seems to be that both states are hedging their bets and also overestimating the maneuvering space for their opponent, while underestimating the other side’s strengths and unwillingness to compromise.
On the other hand, the White House seems unlikely to meet the North Korean demand that some (or all) of the most important and crucial sanctions be lifted without serious progress on denuclearization as a quid pro quo. The argument is that if the backbone of the sanctions are removed, the impact of the sanctions will be reduced and thereby reduce any incentive for North Korea to denuclearize at all. Here there seems to be a serious division between the negotiating parties: the North Koreans view the sanctions as connected to the further development of nuclear weapons, while the U.S. (and most of the international community) views them as directly linked to existing nuclear capacity. How the denuclearization is perceived is another obvious example of the two sides having vastly different interpretations of a key demand. The U.S. views this process as being a largely unilateral effort by North Korea, which in turn views the process in a more regional context. Pyongyang has insisted that denuclearization must take place on the whole of the Korean Peninsula, which would most likely entail the U.S. nuclear umbrella being removed from South Korea.
It would moreover be a gross simplification to argue that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is limited to the nuclear issue. In reality it is much broader than that but even the “limited” scope of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula or just North Korea, provision of security assurances, lifting of sanctions, and a formal end to the Korean War through a peace treaty are all issues in which all regional actors have a stake. These issues require multilateral agreements if they are to be sustainably implemented. The consequences of a failure, or indeed success, in securing the denuclearization of the DPRK, are thus very much of regional and even international importance. It is also vital to appreciate that the process is so much more than simply a question of keeping or destroying nuclear armaments, even if the DPRK’s arsenal takes a position of prominence in the media and in the demands of some actors.
Fragility (action) versus stability (inaction)?
It is also necessary to realize that bilateral frameworks can be more fragile than their multilateral counterparts, and could be utilized as part of a short-term political game rather than a sustainable long-term security dialogue. Despite the positive effects a top-down approach could have as long an agreement (or personal amity) between the leaders these structures exist, the reliance of personal relationships could add to the insecurity and fragility of the long-term relations as these relationships inevitable change over time. While all political processes are driven by political interests and unilateral agendas, these become more diluted in a multilateral setting. This is not to say that the two approaches are mutually exclusive: multilateral meetings need to go in parallel with bilateral meetings to support and reinforce the bilateral processes and vice versa. This is why it is essential to strengthen the bilateral dialogues between the different actors with a multilateral framework that could go beyond the short-term bilateral interests.
A broad inclusiveness in a proposed regional framework would be essential to create more stable negotiations around the Korean Peninsula. Without a multilateral framework it will be impossible to sustain sanctions if negotiations break down; and on the other hand, it is impossible to lift the international sanctions without multilateral consensus, and it would also be difficult to promote a sustainable approach to economic development without a wider agreement. In an unsuccessful or incomplete scenario, which is likely considering the failure in Hanoi, there will be a need to mitigate tensions and try to reestablish security-building and denuclearization in a situation of no or limited trust between actors. Failure could be an option as the main parties are not on the same page and the value of different actions is perceived very differently among the states involved and in the organizations that have a stake in the process. This necessitates a compromise on all sides, and that the interests of all actors be taken into consideration, without necessarily surrendering the core values of each individual state.
Spoiler problems could be endemic if strictly bilateral negotiations continue to be the driving mechanism. China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan all have interests in the process and will not sit idly by waiting for decisions which directly concern their future. Incorporating the interests of a broader group of actors will be essential if a peace treaty or economic deal are to be successful, but also to prevent competing bilateral agendas undermining long-term security. There are furthermore limits to inter-Korean negotiations if the positions and interest of other powers are not included, in particular those of the U.S. and China. A regional mechanism would be able to address some of the issues of contention between Washington and Beijing which so far have prevented a long-term solution of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. A multilateral framework, therefore, would give each actor a voice and stake in shaping the outcome of the peace/denuclearization process, even if this would suffer from severe restrictions due to the reality that the region is still not ready for a more extensive multilateral security mechanism.
Multilateral negotiations between the key regional parties are also needed in the future to discuss more relevant regional security issues, such as a peace treaty, international sanctions, and economic aid. In fact, the latter will become increasingly necessary for reasons of inclusivity, coordination, and to address issues that cannot be resolved bilaterally. It is also clear that multilateral security instruments need to be integrated into a longer-term process of denuclearization and normalization in the region. Long-term measures to solve nuclear issues in Northeast Asia should look beyond the details of the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Cooperation should be gradually built on collaboration, to promote the safe use of nuclear energy, non-proliferation, to more ambitious denuclearization issues such as safeguards and verification systems. Such measures would better answer whether a regional approach can be applied to Northeast Asia to resolve common problems each country is facing in the region. It is necessary for all sides to reaffirm that the end goal remains full denuclearization of the Peninsula.
All of this, again, is not to dismiss bilateral negotiations, which are absolutely crucial, but rather to indicate that there is a need to connect bilateral negotiations to the longer-term need for multilateral frameworks.
The current window of opportunity is limited and there is a need to establish a multilateral framework not only to lock-in the progress that has been made so far but also to create a format to oversee implementation and ultimately a more sustainable process that involves economic and political normalization in the region. Personal contacts between Chairman Kim and President Trump are reportedly good but President Trump will need some gains to consolidate support at home. Similarly, and potentially more troublingly, President Moon shares some of these needs and has been instrumental in this process. His support domestically has been declining and if President Moon loses his momentum to act in this process it could potentially jeopardize the very positive climate we have seen since January 2018. This in the light of the recent failure to get North Korea on the denuclearization bandwagon threatens the formal and high level process and it will be difficult to maintain the positive momentum that President Trump has been apt to boast about in his tweets.
The formal track one process would need to be supported by informal or semi-formal track 1.5 or 2 processes until a more coherent formal track is established. Despite the obvious need for such multilateral dialogue mechanisms to complement and support official processes, there is a lack of broader sustainable funding to support long-term initiatives as short-term thinking and interests often prevail. The challenge is that low key initiatives struggle to find space and support, and the focus is primarily on direct crisis situations and not on how to prevent situations from developing into crisis in the first place. This could very well be an issue for a multilateral dialogue in the Northeast Asian region as well: when there is not a direct crisis there will be less interest in sustaining dialogues and starting a fresh dialogue is difficult when a crisis is already occurring and trust is lacking.
Concluding remarks
There is no easy way forward in the Korean Peninsula or in terms of regional security cooperation at large. But nonetheless there is a growing need to find sustainable solutions on how to move from bilateral frameworks which exiss today to a multilateral framework that would consider the multilateral needs and concerns over time. The future of East Asia’s security architecture remains open, though the many political, economic and social forces that are having an effect on the status quo mean that the current system cannot be sustained indefinitely. The past decade has seen an accelerating appreciation for the interrelated nature of the region’s economic and security landscapes, and geo-strategic and business interests becoming increasingly intertwined. Multilateral and bilateral frameworks can lend themselves to the building of a new kind of balance in the region, although the two approaches will need to be harmonized with one another and take into account the fragmented interests of the various actors framing the political landscape of Northeast Asia.
At this moment in time, this seems to be an unlikely development and regional commitments are more prominent on paper than concrete action designed to bridge and cut through geopolitical self-interest. This said, there is a growing need for all actors, especially outside of the two big powers, to develop a regional framework that could generate stability over time. Trust needs to be rebuilt and it is imperative that bilateral relations between U.S. and North Korea, but arguably more specifically between the two Koreas, are maintained despite the reemerging tensions. All this said, the reality is very much that despite good intentions a regional framework is no stronger than the political will to compromise and find middle ground, something which appears to be in short supply today.
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