Abstract:
The article is dealing with current state of affairs of Russian Federation with key centers of power in Pacific Rim and analysis of long-term interests of Russia towards the mega-region. Author is developing several scenarios of future of Pacific Rim security from long-term perspectives. He concludes that multipolar regional security system with balance of power of leading regional countries (USA, China, South Korea, Russia, Australia) and important external actors (India, European Union) will the most probably prevail in the region.
Introduction
Formulating a long-term policy toward Pacific Rim and Asia occasionally was attempted by Russia’s leaders but only as an integral part of developing a general strategy for the foreign policy of Russia. During the 1990s Russia did not attend too much to the state’s long-term strategy in the field of international relations or to identifying foreign policy priorities. On April 23, 1993 President Boris Yeltsin endorsed the Concept of Foreign Policy of Russia, and it was the first goal-setting document of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy. The CIS countries and those of the Trans-Atlantic region were identified by the Kremlin as priorities for that decade, while all other parts of the world including Asia, Africa, and Latin America were allowed to recede into the background. Through a process of “optimizing presence abroad,” Russia closed several Consulates and reduced the staff of most Embassies, shut down military bases abroad, and withdrew its military advisers.
The presidential dimension in the definition of Russian foreign policy is relevant and objectively conveyable. The constitution of the Russian Federation came into force on 12 December 1993 ensuring its approval by the Russian people. It has been described by Sakwa as “superpresidential” and “pseudo parliamentary”.
The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation approved by President Putin on 28 June 2000 explicitly referred to the defining importance of sovereignty, statehood and state ‘actorness’. In fact, it highlighted the importance of strengthening Russia’s statehood, of protecting “the State sovereignty of Russia and its national economy in conditions of globalization and of countering attempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state with the final outcome of a threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs.” The 2008 FP concept approved by President Medvedev on 12 July 2008 is along the same lines and reaffirms these concepts with renewed vigor. Article 80, comma 2 of the Russian constitution, at the very beginning of the section on the presidency, rules that the President: “Shall adopt measures to protect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and state integrity, ensure coordinated functioning and interaction of all the bodies of state power.”
Hence, the very first connotation of the role of the President, after the obvious affirmation of him being the head of the State, refers to his duties as guardian of the sovereignty and statehood of the country; these concepts in turn constitute, as mentioned before, defining goals of Russian foreign policy. Similarly, Article 80 comma 3 rules that the President shall “determine the guidelines of the internal and foreign policies of the State”. Deriving from the latter, comma 4 specifies that the President shall “represent the Russian Federation within the country and in international relations”. Article 83 presents a list of competences exclusively falling under the jurisdiction of the Presidency; among them, there are some directly connected to the foreign policy of the country and its external security ramifications:
1) appoint and dismiss, upon recommendation of the Chairmen of the Government, the Deputy Chairmen of the Government and the federal ministers; and consequently, also the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The foreign minister, as ruled by a decree of Russia’s first President Boris Yeltsin dating back to March 1995, must report directly to the president, thus formally bypassing the prime minister. The deputy ministers of foreign affairs are also appointed by the President. “
2) form and head the Security Council,
3) form the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation,” and transitively its “Presidential Foreign Policy Directorate,
4) appoint and dismiss plenipotentiary representatives of the President of the Russian Federation,”
5) upon consultation with Federal Assembly’s committees and commissions, “appoint and recall diplomatic representatives of the Russian Federation in foreign States and international organizations.”
Article 86 merges the precedent provisions reaffirming the presidential grip on the foreign affairs stating that he shall “govern the Foreign Policy”; he/she shall guide the signing of international treaties, agreements and ratification instruments, as well as receive diplomatic credentials and letters of recall.
A new stage of development of Russia's foreign policy began in 2000, when second President of Russia Vladimir Putin signed a founding document titled “The Foreign Policy Concept of Russia,” proclaiming “... a system of views on the content and main directions of foreign policy of Russia.” Its adoption on June 28, 2000 was preceded by special decrees issued by Acting President Vladimir Putin: the National Security Concept of Russia (January 10, 2000) and the Military Doctrine of Russia (April 21, 2000). For the first time in Russia's post-Soviet history an attempt was made to devise a long-term strategy of the State in the area of international security. Moreover, in all of these documents Pacific Rim received considerable attention.
Soon after being elected third President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev endorsed an updated and expanded version of the Concept of Foreign Policy of Russia (July 12, 2008) which is currently the most significant declaration of Russia’s national interests and foreign policy objectives.
In terms of managing the foreign policy of Russia, those were inter-agency documents intended to define consistent goals of the state at the international level regarding some major challenges of globalization and to promote national interests in specific regions of the country. They were also meant to be a guideline for other countries regarding the main priorities of Russia's foreign policy in the medium term.
Analyzing the content of the Foreign Policy Concept endorsed by the President of Russia on July12, 2008 one can see that Asia is beginning to rank significantly higher on the list of Russia’s foreign policy priorities. It is important to note that Asia, more than any other region in the world, in the views of Russian foreign policy strategists, requires a differentiated approach that would focus both on the matters pertaining to that part of the world and on Russia's interests vis-à-vis each individual country. Perhaps the only common element in Russia’s strategy toward the various countries and sub-regions of Asia is what can be termed “multipolarity”, while its dynamic reflection at the regional level is the thesis of the “multi-vector” policy of Russia toward Asia …
To illustrate the point let us consider a few excerpts from the text of the “Concept of Foreign Policy of Russia", adopted in 2008:
“In the context of the Russian Federation's multi-vector foreign policy, the Asia–Pacific Region has important and ever-increasing significance, which is due to Russia's belonging to this dynamically developing region of the world, its interest in tapping its potential for the realization of programs aimed at economic development of Siberia and the Far East, the need for strengthening regional cooperation in the field of countering terrorism, ensuring security and maintaining a dialogue between civilizations. Russia will continue to actively participate in major integration mechanisms of the Asia–Pacific Region, notably the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, the mechanisms of partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including the ASEAN Regional Forum.
The development of friendly relations with China and India forms an important track of Russia's foreign policy in Asia. Russia will build up the Russian–Chinese strategic partnership in all fields on the basis of common fundamental approaches to key issues of world politics as a basic constituent part of regional and global stability. Bringing the scope and quality of economic interaction in line with the high-level of political relations constitutes a major task in the field of bilateral ties.
While deepening strategic partnership with India, Russia keeps by its line of principle aimed at strengthening interaction on topical international issues and comprehensive strengthening of the mutually advantageous bilateral ties on all fronts, particularly in ensuring a substantial growth in the trade and economic sphere.
Russia shares the interest displayed by China and India in building effective foreign policy and economic interaction in a trilateral format – Russia-India-China.
It is of fundamental importance to Russia to bring about a peaceful and sustainable climate for Asia where there are still sources of tension and conflicts and a growing risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. …
Russia will fully contribute to finding political and diplomatic ways of solving the situation regarding the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran based on the recognition of the right of all States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as well as upon strict compliance with the requirements of nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The deepening crisis in Afghanistan poses a threat to the security of the southern CIS boundaries. Russia, in collaboration with other countries concerned, the United Nations, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and other multilateral institutions, will make consistent efforts to prevent the export of terrorism and drugs from Afghanistan, find a just and lasting political solution to the problems of this country while respecting the rights and interests of all country's ethnic groups and achieve post-conflict rehabilitation of Afghanistan as a sovereign and peace-loving State..»
Regionalization of Asia
As far as the long-term prospects of developing relations of cooperation, on the one hand, and exacerbating of the conflict in Asia, on the other, are concerned, one can envisage a strengthening of regionalization in the Asia-Pacific region. In our view, the regionalization of the region will evolve along the lines of an increase in the authority of the state, economic potential, and “soft power” of the leading actors of the continental politics. From the point of view of Pacific-wide processes, the picture seems quite finished and simple, and in the long run China, Japan and USA will remain centers of regional policy, whereas a more detailed view of the problem of regionalism in Pacific shows that the picture is lot more complex. Of course, Russia will remain an independent player in Asia, and it will be building relations with other major players on the basis of the principle of “equidistance”. South Korea cannot afford to be drawn into the sphere of influence either of China or Japan, and many of the major nations of the world are very interested in preserving South Korea’s autonomy in East Asian politics.
Among other centers of regional significance that will maintain a high degree of autonomy in formulating and implementing their political and economic strategies are such dissimilar states as Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand. Thus, Pacific regionalism will not lead to a simplification of the geopolitical picture to a by- or tri-polar system. The number of actors in regional politics will be quite large, and their abilities to conduct autonomous policies will be carefully guarded both by major non-regional powers such as India and the European Union and by some Asian countries, mostly located out of the region, including Russia. In mid- to long-term perspective the Pacific security system will be a complex and dynamic network of balances of military, political and economic interests in the region.
Relations between the two Koreas
After the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia chose not to continue the support of the North Korean regime, but, on the contrary, to build relations with each of the two states on the Korean Peninsula individually. This policy led to the emergence and rapid development of political and economic ties between Moscow and Seoul, but on the other hand, it deprived Moscow of any real leverage over North Korea. The attempts by Kim Jong Il in the early 2000s to restore special relations between Pyongyang and Moscow and to resume receiving military and economic aid almost completely failed. Russia is certainly interested in defusing the situation on the peninsula and in denuclearization of North Korea. But it is almost completely unable to influence North Korea and it is following the policy line determined in Washington and Beijing. For them the Korean Peninsula has become one of the few very tangible areas of rivalry, and it is important to note that so far this rivalry has been proceeding in quite an acceptable form based on a desire to avoid escalation of the conflict. Russia is going to continue to develop relations with South Korea welcoming investments from this country, as well as to promote Russia's exports of fuel and industrial products. Moscow will try to play the role of a mediator between North Korea and the United States, but, in truth, this role should belong to China as the only state in the region capable of influencing the policies of Pyongyang.
China
The future of China is one of the main factors of uncertainty in the global politics. When extrapolating the current pace of growth of the Chinese economy, its military spending and influence in various regions of the world, the widely used slogan of the Chinese propaganda that we are living in “the age of the dragon” does not seem to be an overstatement. Yet, history has never seen examples of a state advancing at such a phenomenally rapid pace for too long. Such growth is usually impeded by imbalances in the development of domestic infrastructure, the inability to ensure a comprehensive improvement of socio-economic sphere, the lag in the training of human resources, and etc. In addition, of particular importance is the level of growth of other leading states within the international system. The theory of hegemonic stability which most adequately analyzes the phenomenon of establishing and preserving the “world's political and economic leadership” by individual states is based on the assumption that there must be several important factors present for a certain state to become a global leader. Such a State should be able:
1) To ensure a relative openness of markets and liberalization of the global economic trade system;
2) To withstand economic cycles, or at least be able to provide long-term financial assistance to countries affected by crises;
3. To control a relative stability of exchange rates;
4. To take a leading role in the coordination of macroeconomic policies within the system;
5. To serve as a lender of last resort, providing counties in crisis with financial liquidity (especially in times of acute financial crisis).
Modern China does not and until 2030 will not meet the criteria of a global leader for the following reasons:
1) China does not have a liberal politico-economic system. On the contrary, it is trying to gain unilateral benefits from liberalization of the global trade and will not attempt to create a liberal economy in the coming years up to 2030.
2) The top economies (U.S., EU, and India) will never fully recognize China's leadership in defining their macroeconomic policies, and will not subordinate their economic behavior to the strategic interests of China at international level.
Because of this we can assume that the economic slowdown and escalating disparities in development of various regions of China will result in a growing readiness of the Chinese leaders to consider “joint action” within the Asian political and economic system as the most important characteristic of China's foreign policy over the long-term. China will remain a regional leader, and its “soft power” and the attractiveness of the ideas of the “Beijing Consensus” will continue to grow, but its ability to act unilaterally will remain limited.
South Asia
South Asia is a region that has been plagued with conflict and high tension since the collapse of the British Empire and the emergence of independent states in the aftermath. Meanwhile, Russia has inherited from the Soviet Union the role enabling it to intervene in the affairs of the region as a way of precaution. However, if during the Soviet times the Soviet Union’s sympathies lay firmly with India, especially since the start of the war in Afghanistan in December 1979, later on Russia's foreign policy toward South Asia went through several stages. The period of Yeltsin's presidency coincided with a weakening of the bond between Moscow and New Delhi. On the one hand, Russia gratefully acknowledged the important political and protocol value that the leaders of India attached to relations with Russia regularly visiting Moscow for Russia-India summits. Particularly helpful for Russia were India's purchases of Russian weapons, especially aircraft and naval equipment. However, at the political level there was a clear cooling of relations. The fact that Boris Yeltsin visited India only once during the entire period of his presidency is an eloquent testimony to relations between the parties. At the same time Russia tried to develop and strengthen relations with Pakistan. These efforts proved ineffective producing a negative impact on the Russo-Indian relations.
Since the election of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of Russia relations between Russia and India have experienced significant improvement. The annual visits of leaders of the two countries to attend bilateral summits, meetings of foreign ministers, and the sessions of the Intergovernmental Commission became a regular application of the bilateral relations. The parties were able to increase the volume of bilateral trade. India invested in Russia’s sector of power production, and the Indian market is getting increasingly open to Russian direct and portfolio investment. The friendly character of relations between Russia and India is an ongoing trend.
By 2030 the relations between Russia and India will grow steadily. There will be an increase in bilateral trade, investment, the practice of establishing joint ventures, and tourism. However in some regions of the planet Russo-Indian relations will be subject to increased competition. Above all, it concerns the future rivalry for natural resources in Central Asia, and negotiations on conditions of transit of Indian goods through the territory of Russia (or bypassing the territory of Russia) to the EU markets. One cannot rule out the increasing contest between Moscow and Delhi for the opportunity to extract mineral recourses from the bottom of the Arctic Ocean. The value of multilateral cooperation for Russo-Indian relations will also gradually grow. This refers to the cooperation within the trio of Russia-India-China, BRICs, and APEC. India has a great interest in the activities of the SCO, and in the future its participation in this organization as a full member should not be ruled out. The importance of the SAARC – South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation where India plays a key role will also be growing. The leadership of India in the SAARC and that of Russia in the CIS offer good opportunities for partnership between the two integration blocs in building transport infrastructure, advancing mutual trade in goods and services, resolving the issues of immigration of labor, and possibly – establishing a free trade zone in the future.
Japan
For nearly two decades modern Japan has been preoccupied with solving its acute economic problems that put its economy on the brink of crisis and stagnation. Getting integrated into the global economy during the 80s on the terms of the system devised by the United States is widely recognized by experts as Japan’s biggest strategic mistake whose consequence it is still battling against. Tokyo fears the growing might of China and sees the presence of the U.S. armed forces on its territory and in adjacent waters of the Pacific Ocean as the main guarantee against adverse developments in East Asia. Japan's financial system continues to be one of the largest in the world, and in such areas as high technology the country maintains the status of a global leader. Nevertheless, in the long term modern Japan tends to be losing its influence in the world and in Asia, in particular. In order to mitigate the impact of this trend Tokyo should be interested in improving relations with Russia. However, so far there is no indication that Russia would make any territorial concessions for the sake of signing a peace treaty with Japan, but the latter itself is ready to give up its claims to the “northern territories”. The territorial dispute between Russia and Japan will not have been solved by 2030, and consequently, the bilateral relations will continue to encounter artificial obstacles.
Conclusion: Scenarios
When examining the contemporary international processes and the role of globalization in the changing balance of power in the world, Asian countries always become the centerpiece of the analysis. However, the Asian approach to globalization differs significantly from the European or North American ones. The Asian nations do not call for “superseding the state” or creating supranational structures to manage the economy or handle security issues. On the contrary, they pursue their interests by strengthening the system of the sovereign state to guard against the devastating effects of globalization and the increasing international competition. The reaction of the Asian states to the international financial and economic crisis of 1997-98, as well as to the current crisis that began for Asia in the mid-2008, has shown that it was the state and its institutions, namely the government and state-owned companies and banks, that are the last line of defense of the national economy against external shocks. As of now, in the field of politics and military security the superiority of the state over all other actors of Asian politics is beyond doubt. On this basis we would like to suggest four possible scenarios of how Asia might evolve in the future up to the year 2030. We would also like to speculate as to how Russia might adjust its strategy in the region vis-à-vis a long-term Asian development.
Scenario One: Multipolarity
Initially the idea of multipolarity was proposed by Russia in an attempt to forestall the deterioration of its political and economic standing which it inherited from the Soviet Union and which it had seen fall steadily year after year ever since. Russia’s share in the global economy had dropped (from approximately 10 to 1.2 percent), its influence in Europe and the post-Soviet space was also in decline. Russia’s public diplomacy efforts proved to be ineffective even in the countries whose elites and populations were generally well disposed to maintain a special relationship with Moscow.
The concept of multipolarity, which has been reflected in almost all the doctrines and policy documents governing the military-political life of Russia, looks better in theory than in practical application. From the Russian perspective the world's leading nations should re-establish what following the Vienna Congress (1815) came to be called the “Concert of Europe”. One should recall that it was founded on a common aspiration of the leading nations of the period (the UK, Russia, France, Austria and Prussia) to avoid turmoil in European politics and to maintain the status quo in the aftermath of decades of wars and upheavals caused by the Great French Revolution and the reign of Napoleon. Although it survived in the original form for only about a quarter of a century, the “ Concert of Europe” was able to create mechanisms of deterrence granting Europe almost a hundred years of peace (1815-1914).
Russian appeals to overcome unilateralism in contemporary world politics dominated by the United States and NATO receive verbal support from virtually all the leading Asian states. However, thus far there is no clear concept as to what states should participate and in what way such multipolarity could be established. The periodic summits and meetings of foreign ministers of India, China and Russia, joined by their Brazilian counterpart in the summer of 2009 at the summit in Yekaterinburg, suggest that the idea of multipolarity as one of the options for the development of Asian politics is still alive. From Russia's perspective such three-pole architecture of security and balance of power in the mainland of Asia is optimal. It was exactly what Prime Minister of Russia Yevgeny Primakov spoke about in the autumn of 1998 putting forward the idea of a “triangle” comprising the three countries. However, now, a decade later, it has become obvious that the idea of a strategic partnership and joint management of Asian security is unworkable. The long-term national interests of the three states are quite different. Their views on their future roles in world politics also diverge.
For example, Russia seeks to restore its influence in the post-Soviet space and does not dream of the more distant regions where it used to play a key role.
China is progressing gradually to the status of the world's leading economic power (hoping to reach it by the middle of this century), and its main interest is to peacefully bring its political influence in the world in line with its increased economic and military might.
India aspires to increase its role in international affairs which may result in obtaining the status of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, as well as in establishing a fully integrated union under its leadership in South Asia.
In the future up to 2030 Russia will continue its efforts to create an Asian multilateral security system based on the balance of regional powers. It will try to delay the reform of the UN and the Security Council. It will not oppose the extrusion of the U.S. presence from post-Soviet states and will attempt to replace it in Central Asia.
This scenario for Asian security is quite plausible given that by 2030 there are no major crises (conflicts with the use of nuclear weapons, a large-scale military conflict between states in the region, disintegration of large states, etc.) that could unravel the evolvement of the Asian security system realizing a nightmare scenario that would be impossible to predict.
Scenario Two: Leadership of China
By 2030 the Chinese economy will equal that of the U.S. and the stock market in Shanghai will be the largest in the world, far ahead of the NYSE, Tokyo’s Nikkei and London’s FTSE. In 2010 already, the Chinese economy will become the second largest in the world, enabling it to acquire a qualitatively different status. From now on China will be able to determine the direction of global economic processes, and its opinion will not be disregarded even by such giants as the United States, European Union, or Japan. In the autumn of 2009 some Russian economists acknowledged the reorientation of the Russian economy toward the Chinese market and the inclusion of the country in the global division of labor as a supplier of raw materials or semi-finished products as a major success of Russia's economy during the global crisis of 2008-09. Indeed, by maintaining high GDP growth rates and boosting the consumption capacity of its domestic market, China is increasing its attractiveness as a center of magnetism for the world economic processes. Thus, the current Chinese leaders are planning to turn the regional leadership of China into the global one.
Nevertheless, the scenario of “leadership of China” seems unlikely for several reasons associated with acute and intractable problems of modern China:
1. A total lack of political reforms and failed attempts to reconcile the ideas (rhetoric) of socialism with the market economy.
2. The preservation of a huge and inefficient public sector in the form of large industrial enterprises in the mainland provinces of the country, whose maintenance is becoming increasingly burdensome for the country's budget.
3. A growing divide between China's affluent coastal area and the poor central and western parts, which could heighten social tensions and political instability.
4. The economic slowdown due to the global crisis and as part of a long-term global trend which started in the OECD countries in the middle of the previous decade.
5. Growing unemployment and dissatisfaction with the policy of moderate reforms of the Communist party and the military elite.
6. Uncertain impact of China's accession to the WTO on the country's economy and its export-oriented industries.
7. Increasing complexity of the political and economic relations between China and the United States, Taiwan, Japan and several other neighboring states.
China will undoubtedly be the most notable actor of Asian politics by 2030, but its influence will be counterbalanced by other states or their alliances. Russia will make great efforts to develop economic ties with China, but security cooperation within the SCO framework, or the Russia-India-China triangle, or the BRIC countries will be minimal.
Scenario Three: U.S. Leadership
The U.S. actual defeat in Iraq and the perceived difficulties inherent in the completion of operations in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of American troops have already led to an apparent decrease in the U.S. capacity to project its military and economic power in the Asian region. It is no coincidence that during his visit to China in November 2009 Barack Obama cautiously raised the question of establishing the G-2 – an alliance between the largest power of the previous century (USA) and the largest power of this century (China). It is significant that the Chinese did not show interest in such a prospect. In other words, Beijing does not believe that Washington will be able to restore its influence in the world undermined by consequences of the neo-conservative rule, or to restore its ability to exert decisive influence on the events in Asia.
Nevertheless, the ability of the U.S. to act independently in protecting its own interests in Asia as well as in alliance with other states such as Japan, South Korea, and in the future, possibly, India, gives us good reason to consider a scenario in which Washington would be able to preserve its key position in the region as fairly realistic in the long run. Virtually all Asian countries are interested in the U.S. to remain a potent regional power for various reasons. China vitally needs access for its products to the U.S. market. India is interested in increasing cooperation with the United States in the areas of information technology and high-tech. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan view Washington as the chief guarantor of their security and territorial integrity. Therefore, in 2030, just like now, the U.S. influence in Asia will be significant, while in addressing the most pressing military and political issues – absolutely crucial.
Russia is quite happy with a moderate U.S. meddling in the affairs of Asia since it counterbalances the positions of some major regional players (China, Japan, India, etc.). Therefore, Moscow will not oppose the U.S. anywhere in the Asian region except in Central Asia. The litmus test of Russia’s reaction to the U.S. policy in Asia is the Russo-Iranian relations and Moscow's readiness to support tougher sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program. Since non-nuclear Iran serves the long-term interests of Russia, Moscow will try to promote the goals of U.S. policy toward this state, while avoiding a complete rupture of Russo-Iranian relations. This is an extremely difficult task for the Russian diplomacy, and there is no guarantee that it will be able to handle it successfully in the next few years.
Scenario Four: Chaos
This scenario seems unlikely for the entire of Asia since the forces that promote order and stability in the region are considerably stronger than the forces and processes of destruction.
On the one hand, in some parts of Asia, among which we tend to consider Afghanistan and the neighboring areas of Pakistan, Central Asia around the Fergana Valley, and some areas of possible conflict on the Korean peninsula, the lack of effective governance in some countries of Asia, as well as the desire of some outside extra-systemic players to destabilize the situation could lead to chaos and armed conflicts.
On the other hand, we are convinced that as of now there is no state in the Asian region that is interested in turmoil of revolutionary proportions or that is betting on a large-scale conflict instead of diplomacy and the search for compromises in an attempt to enhance its status in the regional system of security and economy.
Russia will try to prevent the realization of this scenario in every way possible, as the chaos on its southern borders could become a threat not only to its national security, but in the long run – its territorial integrity as well. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by new states of Asia in the long run could bring down the threshold of their use to dangerously low levels. A nuclear conflict in the most populous part of the world would lead to global shocks of unprecedented scale. Consequently, Russia's policy will be aimed at the preservation of controllability of Asian security and the maintenance of regional stability.
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