Introduction

It is hard not to see the global economic, political and social relevance of Korea. It remains one of the last nations that are divided as a result of the Cold War. Development has been very heterogeneous on both sides of the 38th parallel: a vibrant liberal democratic market economy in the South is facing a seemingly stagnant state socialist dictatorship in the North.

Problems of all kinds abound. There is the national tragedy of being a divided nation. Not least because of this, many historical issues with the neighbors remain unresolved; World War II is not over yet in East Asia. Neither is the Cold War. However, the most noted current topic is the North Korean nuclear program. It is an immediate security threat but also raises the more long-term questions of proliferation and setting dangerous examples for other states. Even beyond this, the overall situation on the peninsula is tense. Various military exercises and clashes, and well as dozens of deaths in the past year alone show very clearly that Korea is still a hot spot of international relations - right in the vicinity of the world’s new economic giant China, and the old heavy-weight Japan. The impact of any crisis would be massive.

The nuclear catastrophe in Japan in spring 2011 has once more demonstrated that in this globalized world, few crises will see their effects limited to just one country.[1] Imagine a nuclear strike, or an accident, or in the worst case another Korean War: Even in the unlikely case that the United States were not involved, numbers two, three, eleven and fifteen of the current list of the world’s largest economies would be affected in a way that will lead to a global economic meltdown of unimaginable dimensions.

Against this background, it is easy to understand why China, Japan, Russia and the United States have shown a strong interest in Korea, in particular its Northern part. They participate in the Six Party Talks and, depending on their respective political agendas, discuss diplomatic normalization, initiate sanctions, provide massive economic aid or raise human rights issues.

What is less obvious is the role of Europe which seems to be much weaker than that of the Six Party Talks members. In fact, since the end of KEDO[2] in 2006, neither the EU nor any of its member states is formally involved in key forums of managing the North Korean security and other issues. This is counterintuitive given the relevance of Korea for European interests. Is there any room for Europe to help solving the many pressing issues?

Methodological issues

The biggest conceptual problem if we want to answer this and similar questions is that there is no such thing as an “EU’s view”. There is an EU, at least formally; but it consists of nation states that are still remarkably autonomous. The military operation in Libya in spring 2011 was just one example out of many that showed how different opinions are among member states.[3] The case of Greece has reminded us how heterogeneous EU members are regarding their economic development; not to mention that only 17 of the 27 EU members have the Euro as their currency, although it is one of the core symbols of the Union. Some countries, such as Norway and Switzerland, are not members although they are widely and correctly perceived as being European. Both countries are, however, signatories of the Schengen Agreement[4], while the UK and Ireland, both being EU members, are not. Others, such as Turkey which has for centuries symbolized “the other” from a European perspective are now actively trying to join the EU. And the European Song Contest of 2011 has been won by none other but Azerbaijan, a former Central Asian Soviet Republic situated to the Northeast of Iraq. Things are really complex in Europe.

We will therefore be cautious with the term European Union, and use it only when referring to “Brussels”, that is, EU institutions such as the European Council, the European Commission or the European Parliament. Otherwise, we prefer “Europe” as a less formal aggregate term. When it comes to single initiatives, such as capacity building or trade, we will be as precise as possible and refer to the respective European countries or organizations involved.

We will not be able to cover all aspects of the relationship between Europe and Korea. It is simply too complex and would need a book, rather than a short article, to be treated adequately. We therefore focus on a few selected issues, hoping to offer a general impression rather than aiming for a complete assessment. The topics we will discuss are as diverse as the Europe-Korean relationship. We start with economic exchanges, in particular the free trade agreement. We will then move on to the North Korean problem which naturally forms the core of this article. Finally, we offer a view on European higher education about Korea as it might be offering a way towards improving the bilateral relationship and the European perception of Korea. By combining three such different topics, we hope to have found a fair compromise.

Trade

By far the most outstanding issue in relations between Europe and South Korea has in recent years been the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, which was signed in October 2010 and ratified by the European Parliament in February 2011. We have to note, however, that there is a heavy asymmetry in public recognition of this issue between Korea, where the FTA was intensely and publicly debated, and Europe, where it went by more or less unnoticed by the majority.

The reasons for his asymmetry are relatively easy to understand: The roughly 66 billion Euro trade volume in 2010 meant 2.3% of total trade for the EU, but almost 10% of its total trade for South Korea.[5] Moreover, European states have for decades been used to embracing free trade in principle; thus the public does not pay too much attention although politicians and scholars call this the “most comprehensive trade agreement ever negotiated by the EU”[6]. The situation is very different in South Korea where the Korea-US FTA has sparked a heated debate. This is not to say that Europe is generally more open to free trade than Korea. In fact, many non-European partners are still quite critical and speak of the “Fortress Europe”. But it would not come to too many European’s mind to demonstrate against an FTA.

Politicians on both sides are quick to point out the benefits of tariff reduction or elimination, hoping for a 20% increase in trade volume mostly in services.[7] Nevertheless, it has taken at least four years of negotiations before the agreement could be signed. An assessment and in particular contextualization can be found in the European Foreign Policy Scorecard[8], a policy report issued regularly by the European Council on Foreign Relations. Not surprisingly, we find the priorities being China, Russia, and the United States, followed by “wider Europe” (including Turkey, the Balkans, and the Caucasus region). Other countries are included in larger categories such as “crisis management” and “multilateral issues”. Korea is mentioned only a few times in this document. The EU-Korea FTA is noted, but it appears to be seen as part of a larger process, not as a major issue in itself: “Meanwhile, the EU concluded – swiftly by usual standards – a major bilateral trade agreement with South Korea, as well as other bilateral agreements with a group of Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama), and with Peru and Colombia.”[9] We even find slightly critical tones when China’s greater willingness to cooperate on joint standards is highlighted: “In fact, the EU has been more successful with China in this respect than with other Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea that have developed their own indigenous standards.”[10]

In general, the relations between Europe and South Korea focus on economic aspects such as trade (and investment, which is not covered here). They thus follow rather ordinary, stable patterns as we know them from other such bilateral relationships. Relative size and asymmetry play a role, but this is not very surprising. The big Chinese market overshadows business opportunities in South Korea. Nevertheless relations are brisk, regular, and mutually beneficial.

North Korea

A completely different picture of Europe-Korea relations is provided if we look at North Korea, which is mostly a politically determined field. Even during the Cold War, when it was more or less a part of the socialist camp[11], the intensity of the relationship was very low.[12] With the exception of those who remembered the Korean War, most Europeans did not even know that Korea existed. The Neutral Nations Commission[13] which was established to safeguard the ceasefire agreement in 1953 received little attention. Only after 1990, this situation changed.

Prompted by the famine of 1995-1997, and driven by humanitarian concerns, the EU seemed on the way towards developing a stable, active and broadly backed policy on North Korea. Delegations of the European Parliament visited North Korea several times. The European Council Meeting in Stockholm in March 2001 agreed to enhance the role of the EU in support of peace, security and freedom on the Korean Peninsula by deciding on what can be seen as the indisputable highlight of relations between the EU and North Korea so far—the visit of a high-ranking EU delegation to Pyongyang in May 2001, including Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, who at that time held the EU Presidency, External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana.[14] A few days later the European Commission, in consultation with the member states, decided to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. Subsequently, the first explanatory talks between Pyongyang and Brussels on human rights started on 13 June 2001. With the exception of France and Estonia, all EU member states have established diplomatic relations, although only a few (including the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) maintain resident embassies in Pyongyang.

The EU has been active in North Korea including humanitarian aid, development assistance, and financing of the Light Water Reactor project through KEDO. The amounts of money spent sound impressive, but how do they fare if put into perspective? One way to measure interest is to look at the willingness to pay. In our analysis of international support for North Korea, we found that humanitarian support to North Korea through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) since 1995 and via the United Nations’ World Food Program and various European NGOs amounted to 0.10 EUR per capita for the 15 EU member states before the enlargement of May 2004. The total amount of aid provided to the North by South Korea during the same period was about 7.30 USD per capita. In per capita terms, Seoul has thus transferred about 70 times more funds to North Korea than the Europeans. Japan’s contributions were about 0.34 USD per capita—more than three times higher than the deliveries by the EU.[15]

A similar picture is presented by the activities related to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The EU, represented by the European Atomic Energy Community, joined KEDO as an executive board member in September 1997. In 2006, KEDO decided to end the project and dissolve itself. The biggest donor for KEDO was South Korea with 1,364 million US$, followed by Japan (480 million US$), the USA (405 million US$), and the European Atomic Energy Community (121 million US$). In addition, single EU member states such as Germany, Italy and the UK contributed about 1 million US$ each.[16]

For a while, the EU has been very active in terms of technical assistance. A first fact-finding mission was sent to North Korea in February 2001. Efforts were made to initiate a training program for officials from key ministries, such as Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Foreign Trade. A North Korean delegation headed by Foreign Trade Minister Ri Gwan Gun visited Brussels, Rome, Stockholm and London between 4 and 16 March 2002 with the declared aim of becoming acquainted with European economic policy models. The author has participated in a number of capacity building and training measures both in North Korea and in third countries such as Switzerland, as well as in a high level meeting with DPRK Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Su Hon in October 2002 during which this and other issues were discussed. We can thus confirm that relations were developing well.

However, under the impact of the revelations in October 2002 that Pyongyang had continued to pursue a nuclear program, EU–North Korean relations were dealt a severe blow in November 2002, when the Council decided that member states had to review their activities regarding North Korea, including technical assistance and trade measures. Only humanitarian and food assistance to the population of North Korea were to remain in place.[17] The past decade has witnessed a dramatic decline in European activity on North Korea. Although EU–North Korean relations recovered slowly in 2003 in connection with hope for progress of the Six-Party Talks, they have so far not reached the pre-2003 level. EU assistance to North Korea is still limited to the humanitarian field.

Accordingly, as of 2011 we find a relatively poor record in Europe’s relations with North Korea. In the above mentioned European Foreign Policy Scorecard human rights are duly noted: “The EU, working with the US, succeeded in maintaining pressure on Iran, Myanmar and North Korea through UN resolutions.”[18] The main focus of the few North Korea related entries is, however, on proliferation. North Korea is seen as part of a bigger issue. Iran seems to be regarded as the top priority in this matter. We find heavy contrasts in the assessment of European policy against non-proliferation in the case of Iran as compared to North Korea: ”The two major cases of proliferation are Iran and North Korea. In both cases, the EU seeks stronger Chinese cooperation both on dialogue with the two regimes and on sanctions, in particular at the UN... Although China is even more isolated on North Korea than on Iran, the EU has less leverage and has had less impact. The EU does not participate in the Six-Party Talks and has influence only through the presence of France and the UK in the UN Security Council.”[19] The problem seems to be certain diversity of opinion or at least of interest: “If they were remarkably united on Iran, with a leading role for Ashton[20] in negotiations with Tehran, Europeans were also united and effective at working with Americans at the NPT Review Conference in May... However, on the other main case of nuclear proliferation – North Korea – they were largely absent.”[21] All in all, we even find some type of resignation when we read: “The EU did not play a comparable part [with Iran] in diplomacy on North Korea’s proliferation activities – but it has never had a strong hand in this area, and Pyongyang’s erratic and aggressive behaviour made diplomatic engagement difficult for all actors.”[22]

The European Parliament is the most active among European institutions in the North Korean human rights issue, driven mainly by individuals, by NGOs[23] and occasionally also by specific political groups from single member states. The author of this paper was invited to testify before the European Parliament in Brussels on this topic in 2006 and observed a keen interest in the matter. Resolutions on human rights are being passed frequently. However, when it comes to drafting and implementing actual policies, the great variety of opinions and the politically risky nature of this emotionally debated topic in the end seem to lead to very little action.

A ray of hope is offered by some recent developments, such as the announcement in early July 2011 of the European Commission to change its policy and to provide food aid to 650,000 of the most vulnerable individuals in North Korea in the amount of 10 million EUR.[24] It shows that after years of inactivity, the EU might be willing to resume its role as a party that puts humanitarian concerns before strategic political considerations. We have yet to see how this will develop, as 15 EUR per person will not solve the problem. With a world market price of about 400 EUR per kg of rice, 10 million EUR will feed 650,000 people for about 60 days if we assume a daily ration of 600 grams and no costs for administration and transportation. If we think about the 100s of 1000s of millions spent on the Greek and other bailouts, 10 million EUR even look slightly cynical.

The public image of North Korea is determined by documentaries that emphasize the dire situation in that country. Occasionally, Kim Jong Il and his family are the object of media coverage due to curiosity over a regime that appears little more than bizarre to most Europeans. The North Korean soccer teams at the world championships draw some attention, usually more for their exotic and mysterious image and less for their athletic performance.

Higher education

We do not agree with the general assumption that North Korea’s negative image overshadows the positive impression generated by South Korea, although there are indeed such tendencies. Most Europeans seem to know that there are two Koreas, even if they are sometimes not sure which part is democratic and which one is communist. But in general, we can safely state that Korea’s image, as well as its presence in European media and in the minds of Europeans, lags behind its actual potential. We have thus decided to add a few remarks on a sector that could make an active contribution to changing this unsatisfactory situation.

It is clearly neither the task nor among the capacities of European universities to act as large-scale promoters of Korea. However, they fulfill an important function: they educate future intellectual leaders. These can serve as resource persons for media; provide policy makers with much needed well-informed and accurate advice; and lower entry barriers for business exchanges in both directions. Equipping these with adequate knowledge about Korea, and more importantly, generating awareness of Korea on a broad scale is a key task. A smart education policy would be a future-oriented strategy to strengthen the positive aspects of Korea’s image in Europe, to raise Korean affairs closer to the top of the list of European’s priorities, and to win more support for Korean initiatives among Europeans and European institutions.

The emphasis here is on “smart”. We have presented a related proposal in some more detail elsewhere[25] and will thus only refer to a few basic aspects here. Any company that wants to enlarge its market share understands that its strategy must consist of two parts: maintaining good relations with its existing customers, and winning new ones. In saturated markets, the latter often means to win them from a competitor. If we apply this to Europe and Korea’s image, we find that existing Korean Studies Programs need continued support from institutions like the Korea Foundation of the Academy for Korean Studies. But consider that at the University of Vienna alone, in 2009 the number of students in Japanese Studies was bigger than the number of students enrolled in all Korean Studies programs combined in the German-speaking world. This shows the need for new strategies.

Emphasizing Korea as part of East Asia as such is a strategy. Utilizing the great interest Europeans have in East Asia, it seems important to ensure than in related programs, Korea is at least integrated. Too often “East Asia” means in fact China and Japan. Korea is left out. However, it should be the other way round: With its rich history and culture, and consisting of two states with such very different political and economic systems, Korea is in many ways perfectly suited to serve as a starting point for the exploration of East Asia.[26]

Conclusion

Let’s be frank: Korea is not Europe’s primary concern. This is not to say that there is no interest; on the contrary, both South Korea’s economic success and the issues surrounding North Korea are noted and discussed. Trade and investment are strong, and Europeans know that nuclear proliferation, as well as humanitarian and human rights issues are matters of global relevance. However, there are more pressing issues on the minds of the people of Europe which often goes at the expense of Korea.

From a general perspective, a recent comment by the German philosopher Habermas is exemplary for the current European self-perception. He criticizes what he calls the flawed design of the monetary union, and observes that “European citizens only see their national governments as actors on the European stage”.[27] He discusses Germany’s role within the EU, and the sorry state of politics. However, there is not much space devoted to external affairs. Clearly, Europe first has to come to terms with its own identity and internal issues before any significant and lasting engagement can be expected for such remote places as Korea. One of these problems is “taming Germany’s power”, which seems to be a policy priority for many European states and thus also poses a challenge to Germany.[28]

What is left of Europe’s attention to matters further away from Europe is traditionally occupied by the transatlantic relationship, and increasingly by China. Geeraerts even believes that a “strategic axis between China and Europe... will be indispensable”.[29] Not everyone agrees; but few Europeans do not think about how best to define their relationship with China. All this does not go so much at the expense of Korea, but rather of Japan which dominated European’s view of East Asia for a good part of the 20th century. Nevertheless, in the close vicinity of the rising giant, little room for more seems to be left in the mainstream European views on East Asia.

This is clearly unsatisfactory, not only from the perspective of Korea. Europe is missing a lot in terms of economic, political and cultural potential if it either ignores East Asia or focuses only on China. It is thus the task of the educational sector to overcome this gap between perception and reality. Making sure that Korea is included in East Asia related programs, think tanks and publications is among the most promising strategies. But in the end, changing views and creating a sustainable positive and strong image of Korea is a long-term task that will depend on factors that are too complex to be influenced directly. Modernizing the economy, opening up towards the world, achieving peaceful national unification and further developing a healthy national pride and self-consciousness are among such strategies for Korea. Europe must resolve its internal issues and position itself as a more independent, active player in international politics. If this can be achieved, Europe’s view of Korea will inevitably be positively affected.

Rudiger Frank

Professor of East Asian Economy and Society at the University of Vienna, also an Adjunct Professor at Korea University and the University of North Korean Studies (Kyungnam University) in Seoul. He holds an M.A. in Korean Studies, Economics and International Relations and a Ph.D. in Economics. In 1991/1992, he spent one semester as a language student at Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang and has been researching North Korea ever since. Visiting Professorships included Columbia University New York and Korea University Seoul. He is a Council member and for the 2011-2013 period the Secretary of the Association for Korean Studies in Europe and Deputy Chief Editor of the European Journal of East Asian Studies. He is co-editor of the annual book “Korea: Politics, Economy and Society” (Brill), Member of the Editorial Board for the book series “Brill’s Korean Studies Library”, an Associate at “The Asia Pacific Journal”, Member of the Editorial Board of “Korea Review of International Studies”, Co-Founder and Member of the Editorial Board, “Vienna Graduate Journal of East Asian Studies” and “Vienna Studies on East Asia”. His major research fields are socialist transformation in East Asia and Europe (with a focus on North Korea), state-business relations in East Asia, and regional integration in East Asia. His most recent book is (with S. Burghart, eds.) “Driving Forces of Socialist Transformation: North Korea and the Experience of Europe and East Asia” (Vienna: Praesens 2010). An edited book “Exploring North Korean Arts” is due to be published in July 2011. Prof. Frank is regularly consulted by governments, media and businesses on North Korea and East Asia. Most recently, this included consultancy work and a background policy paper for The Elders in preparation for the visit by President Martti Ahtisaari, Prime Minister Gro Brundtland, President Jimmy Carter and President Mary Robinson to the Korean Peninsula and China. In June 2011, he has been invited to join the World Economic Forum, Global Agenda Council on Korea.

For more information, see http://wirtschaft.ostasien.univie.ac.at/

For publications, see http://univie.academia.edu/RuedigerFrank

Email: ruediger.frank@univie.ac.at

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